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INTRODUCTION
O
ral Histories represent the recol-
lections and opinions of the person
interviewed, and not the official posi-
tion of MORS. Omissions and errors in fact
are corrected when possible, but every ef-
fort is made to present the interviewee’s own
words.
Dr. Seth Bonder, FS, was MORS Presi-
dent from 1969 to 1970. He received the
Vance R. Wanner Memorial Award in 1986
and was inducted as a MORS Fellow in
1994. He was a full-time faculty member
in the Department of Industrial and Op-
erations Engineering, the University of
Michigan, from 1965 to 1972, and was an
adjunct professor in that department from
1972 to 2011. He was the founder, former
chair and CEO of Vector Research, Incorpo-
rated (VRI) during the period 1972–2001.
Dr. Bonder was president of the Operations
Research Society of America from 1978 to
1979 and inducted as an Institute for Oper-
ations Research and the Management Sci-
ences (INFORMS) Fellow in 2001 (Charter
Member). He was vice president of the In-
ternational Federation of Operational Re-
search Societies (IFORS) from 1985 to 1988.
He received the Jacinto Steinhardt Memo-
rial Award from the INFORMS Military
Applications Society (MAS) in 1999. He
was a member of the National Academy
of Engineering. This interview was con-
ducted on two separate occasions in the
MORS office in Alexandria, Virginia: June 23,
2004 and November 28, 2005. Dr. Bonder
died in Ann Arbor, Michigan on October
29, 2011.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Dr. Seth Bonder, FS
Mr. Mike Garrambone and Dr. Bob Sheldon,
FS, Interviewers
Bob Sheldon: First of all, tell us where
you were born.
Seth Bonder: I was born on 14 July 1932
in South Bronx of New York City. I grew
up there and lived in the same apartment
through the depression years and until I left
in 1951.
Bob Sheldon: Give us your parents’
names and tell us how they might have
influenced your decisions academically or
professionally.
Seth Bonder: My parents were Al and
Minnie Bonder. No real influence. They
were Russian immigrants. They came over
separately and met here in the United
States. They never had a day of schooling
so it hardly had any influence or effect on
my education. In fact, my education didn’t
start until much later in life, as you will see.
Mike Garrambone: Did you speak Rus-
sian at home? What were your parents’
professions or businesses?
Seth Bonder: Although some of my rela-
tives spoke Russian in their household, we
spoke English. I knew a few Russian phrases
from spending time with my relatives.
My parents weren’t professionals—
remember I said they did not have any
schooling. Both worked in the garment
district of Manhattan. My mother was an
‘‘operator’’–she sewed dresses together.
My father was a dress presser who worked
with 25-30 other pressers in a large room.
He would use a heavy cast-iron steam iron
to steam dresses before they were deliv-
ered to department stores in Manhattan.
It was a real sweatshop and a tough job!
He earned every dime he made.
Returning to Bob’s question, I had little
interest in education as I grew up in the
Bronx. I spent very little time with books.
At 15, I was a pretty good three-cushion bil-
liards and pool hustler, played a lot of stick-
ball, and also played a little basketball in
high school. I was a poor student and not
interested in academic activities.
Mike Garrambone: How did you get
good at three-cushion billiards?
Seth Bonder: When I was a youngster,
I spent most of my time on the street like
many of my friends, playing stickball, bas-
ketball, and getting into trouble. We lived
in a one bedroom apartment which was
where I went to eat and sleep. When I was
about 12, I started hanging around the
neighborhood pool hall (which was illegal
in those days). This was not some upper so-
ciety pool hall or even what you think of
as a pool hall today. It was a rough crowd,
many interested in gambling, corruption,
and even some drug peddling. Some of
the older poolroom crowd took me under
their wing and taught me how to play
pocket pool, but I quickly gravitated to
three-cushion billiards. I thought it was
a fascinating game. Much more skill was
involved. After a couple of years with a lot
of time on the table and watching good
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players, I became quite good at understanding
the geometries, controlling ball position, and
the strategy of the game. At 15 I started playing in
some three-cushion and pocket pool big money
games, money provided by big betters and I
would get a small piece of the winnings. When
I was 16 I had a part-time job running and closing
down the pool hall a few nights of the week.
Bob Sheldon: You said you did poorly in high
school. Even in math?
Seth Bonder: Everything. I was not interested
in school. When I was 15, I became a member
of one of the local gangs, which served as a
mutual protection society. Gang members didn’t
think much about schooling; we just survived
in very strange ways. So there was really noth-
ing driving me to do anything academic.
I actually started at City College of New
York (CCNY) because you didn’t need grades
to get in, it was free, I could avoid the draft,
and I thought I might get to play some basket-
ball there. But then they had a big scandal when
the varsity team threw basketball games. In
those days, teams could play in both the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
and the National Invitation Tournament (NIT)
basketball tournaments, and CCNY won both
of them. The next year they started throwing
basketball games. They got caught by the District
Attorney, and the whole program fell apart. Not
long after that, I broke a leg, drove a truck for
a while, and then the Army came after me.
Bob Sheldon: You took one year of college?
Seth Bonder: Well, it wasn’t even that. I
attended for a little more than a semester and
hardly ever went to class. I was in the pool room
or on the basketball court. That’s all I did. I was
there to play, but then I had to leave because
I never attended class. I went to the Air Force
before the Army got me. Not unlike you did,
Bob. I went in as an enlisted man but got com-
missioned later.
Mike Garrambone: When did you start basic
training and where did you go for it?
Seth Bonder: It was late 1951 at Sampson Air
Force Base (AFB) in upstate New York. It was
quite cold. I don’t believe it exists anymore.
The Korean War was on. During that time pe-
riod they allowed enlisted men who did not
have a college degree to go to flight school
through the Aviation Cadet program.
Bob Sheldon: So you didn’t have a degree,
but you were commissioned?
Seth Bonder: Right. I was commissioned
through the Aviation Cadet program.
Bob Sheldon: How long were you in the Air
Force?
Seth Bonder: About five years. It was during
this period that the seeds of my future life were
planted. Everyone I worked with and social-
ized with had college educations—many with
advanced degrees. It became clear to me that
a college education was necessary to have a
meaningful career in the Air Force. A related
anecdote sent a message loud and clear. One of
my assignments was at Edwards AFB, California,
the Flight Test Center. I was at the bar one
night with the personnel officer. He informed
me that a quarter of one percent of the officers
at Edwards AFB did not have a college degree.
And that was me!
He said, ‘‘If you stay in the Air Force you
have to get a degree.’’ I said, ‘‘How do I do that?’’
He said, ‘‘You need to get two years of college
completed through extension courses before
the Air Force will send you full time to get a de-
gree.’’ I thought this would take forever and
wasn’t worthwhile. I decided I’d get out and
try college on my own.
Well, I got out of the Air Force at the end
of 1956 and couldn’t get into college. Nobody
would take me. I called Senator Dollinger from
New York. I said, ‘‘Look, I’m a vet. I don’t have
very good grades but I’m pretty sure I could do
well if they’d let me into college.’’ He con-
vinced the University of Maryland to let me
in. I picked Maryland because I did not want
to return to New York.
That’s how my education started. My par-
ents had little influence on my decision to get
a college education. Rather it was my Air Force
experience and friends, most of whom had one
or more college degrees. I went into engineer-
ing because of my Air Force experience and be-
cause I thought I could probably dig a better
ditch if we had a depression again. I started
in February 1957 and finished in June 1960 with
a degree—major in mechanical engineering and
a minor in physics.
Actually my first semester in Maryland was
a disaster. I don’t think I got higher than a 40
in my first round of midterms. I wanted to be
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back in the Air Force. But I went to counsel-
ing sessions and learned how to study. That
year the academic light was turned on. It was
an amazing transition. I realized I actually
had a brain and could use it. I finished in about
three and a half years even while driving a
taxicab 4-5 nights a week. (After one of my
MORS keynote addresses in the 1970s, an at-
tendee came over and introduced himself as
my Maryland study counselor. He said he
was pleased that his guidance had helped. So
was I!)
After graduation I went to work at West-
inghouse in Baltimore for a couple of months.
I hated it. Sitting at a drafting board was not
stimulating, nor what I wanted to do.
Bob Sheldon: Did you work as a mechanical
engineer?
Seth Bonder: Yes. And fortunately a friend of
mine who was stationed with me at Edwards
AFB was getting a PhD at Johns Hopkins in a
new field called operations research (OR). He
was doing this in 1958–1960. He actually ap-
plied to graduate school for me at two places:
Johns Hopkins, where he was going, and Ohio
State University (OSU). When I was getting
ready to quit Westinghouse, he informed me
he did this and he felt it would be an interesting
field for me because I liked people-oriented oper-
ational problems.
Bob Sheldon: Did you test for scholarships
or were you just offered them?
Seth Bonder: No, they were offered because
I did very well at Maryland. I was in all the
honor and leadership societies. I was older than
everybody so that was to my advantage. I did
some interesting things at Maryland. A Navy
pilot and I helped rejuvenate a flying club in
College Park, and because of my disastrous first
semester, I started a freshman tutoring service
for the University.
Anyway, I went over to Johns Hopkins
and talked to Professor Charlie Flagle. I don’t
know if that name’s familiar to you. In later
years he and I did a lot of work together in the
Operations Research Society of America (ORSA).
As an aside, very few analysts in MORS ever
get involved in ORSA. It’s like two different
worlds. It’s a big mistake for the military OR
community—I believe it would be useful to the
profession if more military OR analysts were
involved with ORSA (now INFORMS) through
MAS (the Military Applications Society).
Charlie Flagle was one of the pioneers of
academic OR. He authored the Flagle, Huggins
and Roy book Operations Research and Systems
Engineering. That was one of the primary OR
books that came out in the late 1950s. Charlie
Flagle was a big name in the field. I went to
see him and he told me the scholarship was
for $1200 a year. And I said, ‘‘That’s pretty tight
to live on.’’
When I went to school at Maryland, I had
the GI bill and I drove a cab at night in Prince
George’s County and the Washington, D.C. area
to make a living. I’d get the cab from a private
owner. He’d switch cars with me about 7 pm,
I’d drive until about one in the morning, and
then he would switch cars back again about
6 am. I would drive about three nights during
the week and 1–2 days during the weekend.
I actually did my first simple operations analy-
sis as a cab driver: I collected and analyzed the
call demand data in Prince George’s County
to learn how to be ‘‘nearby’’ when calls were
broadcast for drivers to bid on.
Bob Sheldon: Do you know the roads around
here pretty well?
Seth Bonder: I do. Well, not here in Virginia,
but I did know Prince George’s County and
D.C. pretty well. Anyway, Charlie said, ‘‘You
have to pay tuition out of that too.’’ And I said,
‘‘How much is tuition?’’ He said, ‘‘$1200.’’
I said, ‘‘I must tell you, Professor Flagle, I can’t
do that and will have to go to another school.’’
I called Dan Howland, the professor at
OSU who extended the fellowship, and said,
‘‘You offered me a fellowship. What is it?’’ He
said, ‘‘You get $300 a month. You don’t have
to work for the first year. Tuition is covered.
We guarantee you a job the second year as a
research assistant.’’ And I said, ‘‘I’m coming.’’
So it turned out I was the first Systems Fellow
at OSU and that’s how I got into the OR field.
When I arrived at OSU, I learned that Dan
Howland was also the head of the Systems Re-
search Group (SRG). Dan is now long gone.
He had a bunch of research projects in OR,
in the military area and in the health area.
He said, ‘‘You can pick an area to work in after
the first year. Since you have a military back-
ground, why don’t you work on a military
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project?’’ That’s how I got into the military OR
business.
At the end of my first year, which was in
1960, I worked on a little project for the military
at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Dan had a number of
contracts with Fort Knox. Nobody in the re-
search group knew much about the Army, but
we had contracts. This one was to determine
the optimal path for a tank to drive through a
contaminated nuclear battlefield. It was being
done for the group at Fort Knox that was called
the Combat Developments Group. I spent time
at Knox learning about the Army. I got intrigued
by what one of the groups was doing. They were
responsible for writing requirements for new ar-
mored systems.
Bob Sheldon: Did you drive to Fort Knox
from OSU?
Seth Bonder: We’d fly down or drive down to
observe their work activities. That was in 1961.
I observed that it didn’t make any sense the
way they were drafting requirements for new
systems. They would sit on large butcher paper
with their slide rules drafting requirements for
the next generation tank. They would calculate
values for many performance characteristics
such as how fast it should go, how far it should
be able to go, how reliable it should be, how
well it should detect targets, the accuracy of
firing the tank’s main gun, and the vulnerabil-
ity of the tank.
I was amazed how primitive the process
was to develop requirements for the next gen-
eration armored systems. It dawned on me
that there were two major problems that would
be interesting to work on. One was the feasibility
of the requirements. If you wrote numbers down
for those variables or parameters, could you,
in fact, build a system with those capabilities?
I doubted it because the process they were us-
ing didn’t take into account the physical inter-
actions among the various parameters.
For example, if they wanted to increase how
fast and how far they wanted the tank to go,
they would specify the speed of the tank and
its cruising range. And if they wanted to, for
example, increase the survivability of the tank
they’d add more armor to it. They neglected to
recognize that if you added more armor and, if
you wanted to go as fast as you said you wanted
to go, you needed a bigger engine. If you added
a bigger engine, you needed more fuel to main-
tain the tank’s cruising range. This would de-
crease the survivability because the additional
fuel made the tank more vulnerable to enemy
fire. They had no idea how to handle those
engineering-level interactions. Based on some
recent experience, I believe this problem may
still exist in a number of military domain areas
today.
The second problem was the issue of what
would be useful to write as performance specs?
Hopefully the specs they wrote would produce
a tank that was operationally effective. That is,
the next generation system would prove to
have a high operational utility on the battle-
field. So you had the feasibility issue and the
effectiveness issue. I discussed this with Dan
Howland who became my PhD advisor. He
said, ‘‘Why don’t you write a proposal to ad-
dress these?’’ I’d never written one but thought
it would be a learning experience.
I wrote it for Fort Knox which was then part
of the Continental Army Command (CONARC).
I’m not sure they understood it. In fact, the
first time I presented it to the Colonel in
charge of the Combat Developments Group
at Fort Knox, he essentially threw me out of
his office. But his staff convinced him it was
worthwhile doing and they moved it forward
to General Daly who was then the Command-
ing General of CONARC. He was a four-star
who looked like General Curtis LeMay, Com-
mander of the Air Force’s Strategic Air Com-
mand, smoked cigars like him, and acted like
him.
I was asked to give a briefing at Fort
Monroe, Virginia, the home of CONARC Head-
quarters. Fortunately we had a number of Army
officers who were in the master’s program with
me at OSU. One of them was Rick Anson, a cap-
tain who went on to become a two-star general.
Others were Major Bill Bercaw, LTC Larry Caid,
and Captain Dan Schroeder.
Bob Sheldon: These were active duty offi-
cers?
Seth Bonder: Yes. They were active duty offi-
cers who went to OSU because there weren’t
many OR educational programs in the country.
You had Case Western, OSU and Johns Hopkins.
These were the three main OR programs that
existed in the early 1960s.
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They helped me write the proposal which
enhanced it by including appropriate Army
jargon. Rick Ansen, who used to be a trainer of
Army briefers said, ‘‘Let me show you how to
do a briefing.’’ This was my first exposure on
how to market in the Department of Defense
(DoD). He said we needed to have slides. In
those days you didn’t have computers to create
graphics. It was very labor intensive at the
Systems Group. They’d make big cardboard
pictures, photograph them, and then put the
negatives in 3½ x 4 inch glass slides (called
lantern slides).
We went down to Fort Monroe. I gave the
briefing and the argument was over which orga-
nization would house it, not whether I’d get it.
General Davis said, ‘‘Look, let’s not air our dirty
laundry in front of these guys from the Univer-
sity.’’ To make a long story short, I received a $2
million contract as a graduate student to run
the proposed four-year research program.
I was the project director and a full-time
graduate student. We started building models
to address the feasibility issue. That is, predict
how fast the vehicle could go, how well the crew
could detect, how accurately it could fire the
main gun, how vulnerable the tank was, etc.
My research staff consisted mainly of graduate
students, supplemented by a few faculty mem-
bers from various disciplines and departments.
That research slowly brought me into the main-
stream of what was happening at the tactical
level of Army OR at that time.
Although OR was conducted for the Army
in WWII, I believe it first got codified in the
late 1940s with the establishment of the Opera-
tions Research Office (ORO). ORO was formed
and run by Johns Hopkins University as the
Army’s first FFRDC (Federally Funded Research
and Development Center) to do strategic-level
and policy-level analysis. This later became Re-
search Analysis Corporation (RAC) in the early
1960s. RAC was sold to General Research Cor-
poration (GRC) in Sep 1972 after the Army in-
formed RAC it would no longer be supported
as an FFRDC. The Army Strategy and Tactics
Analysis Group (STAG) was established as a
field activity under the staff supervision of the
DCSOPS in August 1960 and was subsumed
by the Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA)
when it stood up in 1973.
The tactical level of Army OR and experi-
mentation in the 1950s and 1960s was conducted
and supported by the Ballistics Research Labo-
ratory (BRL), run by guys like Joe Sperrazza,
Keith Myers, and Dave Hardison, and the Com-
bat Operations Research Group (CORG) which
was a field office of ORO. Some of my future
professional friends such as E.B. Vandiver, Hunter
Woodall and John Riente worked there.
I got into the business at the tactical level
of Army OR at OSU under the contract that
I had with Fort Knox. CORG was doing a bunch
of experiments. That was a period in Army OR
that was a scientific era: the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s when the Army did a lot of experimen-
tation. They experimented with tank accuracy,
firing times, vulnerability, pinpoint detection
and other performance characteristics.
I did some limited experimentation at OSU
to assist in developing engineering-level models
of performance capabilities for armored weapon
systems. We worked on vehicle speed and the
impact of vibrations on cross-country speed. We
did theoretical work in the engineering me-
chanics lab, and ran mobility experiments with
a local reserve unit. We did experiments on vi-
sual detection to see how well you could detect
stationary and moving tanks. I almost lost a
couple of my researchers (who were students)
because when a tank was coming at you, you
didn’t see any contrast changes. Some of them
almost got run over. It was an exciting time. We
were supplementing some of the Army’s ex-
perimentation activities and building models
to estimate performance capabilities of future
armored systems.
Mike Garrambone: Were these mathematical
models?
Seth Bonder: Mostly. They were engineering
models that described the physics of various
physical and operational processes.
To assist with our performance-level mod-
eling, Bill Bercaw, an Army major who was a stu-
dent at OSU, arranged for us to go to Fort Knox
and shoot on the firing range. Most of my re-
searchers were students, and some were women.
We’d go out to the range and fire the tank main
gun and the 7.62 mm machine gun. I had one
researcher who was an unbelievable gunner.
They would pull pallets as targets at different
ranges and the idea was to fire a round through
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the first pallet and then, after the gun was
reloaded, fire a round through the second pal-
let if you could. My researcher did that when
the pallets were being pulled at 1800 meters!
Our project officer was quite proud of the re-
search team.
As I said, Army OR was heavily into
experimentation which was necessary and
useful. We learned about the feasibility of
achieving performance levels, and to model
performance capabilities such as hit probabil-
ities, firing rates, firing times, and loading
times. At Fort Knox, I used to have someone
clocking the loading times and the firing times
and used this data to develop models as a
function of the characteristics of the system.
BRL was heavily involved in estimating the
lethality and vulnerability performance char-
acteristics for armored systems.
The Army Materiel Systems Analysis Ac-
tivity (AMSAA) was a spin-off of BRL. BRL
was much more a hard engineering group and
AMSAA looked at issues of system perfor-
mance and effectiveness, just like we were do-
ing in a smaller way at OSU and CORG was
doing. They were also heavily involved in Army
experimentation.
Experiments were done on many of the
armored system performance capabilities. Some
of the early ones were the STALK experiments
(Project STALK tank-versus-tank experiments
in 1953) which Dave Hardison analyzed. It
looked at the impact of different threats, dif-
ferent fire control systems, different size guns
and a few other dimensions on hit probabili-
ties, kill probabilities, detection probabilities,
firing rates, and others.
During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s the
Army OR community was involved in exten-
sive experimentation to gather data about these
performance parameters and to understand fun-
damental land combat processes. We learned
what was important. We learned how to start
building models to predict the system’s perfor-
mance parameters (capabilities) as a function
of its engineering characteristics. (For exam-
ple, the model for hit probability was a bivari-
ate normal distribution with a number of fixed
and variable biases that you had to estimate to
predict the probability of hitting a specific tar-
get with a particular type tank gun. Models of
this performance capability, as well as esti-
mates of the various biases, were being devel-
oped using field and laboratory experimental
data.) We learned how to improve these perfor-
mance capabilities, how to represent them in
combat models, and how to model land combat
processes.
Another experiment was Project Pinpoint,
which John Young ran, to determine how well
you could detect an enemy when they fired a
round and the associated location errors. Our
research at OSU involved theoretical and ex-
perimental activities to develop models of
detection capability based on differences in
contrast stimuli.
It was a wonderful community of aca-
demics like me, industry researchers, and the
Army that participated in these experiments.
That’s when I first met Walt Hollis. In my early
days at OSU we were trying to build models
of systems accuracy and we needed estimates
of the biases and how to predict the biases. Walt
Hollis worked at Frankford Arsenal where he
was a recognized expert in the area. I met Walt
there and learned all about firing main tank
guns.
As I said, it was an exciting period of time.
I was not only developing models to estimate
some of the performance capabilities but de-
veloping software to integrate my models and
the Army’s performance-level models so we
could estimate the feasibility of building a tank
weapon system with these capabilities, consid-
ering all the interactions among them. While
this feasibility-related research was going on,
I also started thinking about the potential effec-
tiveness of the systems in an operational setting.
Bob Sheldon: When you were building
the models, did you use your academic knowl-
edge or were you using knowledge based on
experience?
Seth Bonder: I think both—academic capabil-
ity and experience from some of the modeling
and experimentation work being conducted by
the Army. Obviously, the mathematics was im-
portant. My initial foray into building effective-
ness models back in 1962 or 1963 (which led to
the Bonder Individual Unit Action (IUA) and
many subsequent developments downstream)
was stimulated by a two-star general from the
Combat Developments Command. It was Major
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General Pickett who was responsible for build-
ing the Sheridan system.
He was actually a descendant of George
Pickett from Pickett’s Charge in the Civil War.
He knew I had the contract with Fort Knox.
He came to OSU and said, ‘‘I need to know
about the effectiveness of alternative potential
Sheridan light tanks described by alternative
sets of performance characteristics. Can you
help me?’’
There weren’t any combat models around
that I could responsively use to address his
problem. This was a quick reaction six-week
study – and I was surprised the University let
me do it. We kept it unclassified.
In 1962 there were a small number of com-
bat models being used in Army studies but
which I deemed inappropriate for the Sheri-
dan study. There were large gaming models
which were inappropriate both because they
were more operational-level models, not tactical-
level ones, and due to the requirement for many
players to run them. Then there was ATLAS
(ATactical, Logistical and Air Simulation), an ag-
gregated ‘‘firepower score (FPS)’’ based model
of theater-level combat which was inappropri-
ate for many reasons. It was a ‘‘holistic’’ model
that did not represent details of military sys-
tems or processes that I needed to consider. It
rolled all of these up in a many-to-one transfor-
mation to produce the FPS for each side. In turn
the downstream loss of each side’s FPS and
each side’s movement was determined via some
very questionable look-up tables. I thought the
FPS construct was somewhat ‘‘garbage’’—it
had no scientific basis and in later years I referred
to it as the ‘‘Phlogiston’’ theory of combat. (The
phlogiston theory is an obsolete scientific the-
ory of combustion from the 1700s—phlogiston
theory claimed that combustion gave off oxy-
gen, rather than using it.)
Then we had the Monte Carlo simulation:
Carmonette. I believe it was developed by
Dick Zimmerman at CORG back in the 1950s.
This was an Army company-level model for
blue defense against a red attack or the other
way around. Over the years it was expanded
to battalion-level. It was a ‘‘synthetic’’ model
as opposed to holistic. It considered many of
the relevant tactical-level military processes and
details of the system performance capabilities
like the vehicle speed, hit probabilities, kill prob-
abilities, detection probabilities, etc.
Bob Sheldon: Were you building digital sim-
ulation models?
Seth Bonder: I wasn’t, but Carmonette was
a digital simulation model. Carmonette was the
only tactical-level model around; but it took,
even at a company level, 30–60 minutes of com-
puter time to replicate a single company-level
combat engagement and 15–30 replications to
achieve some statistical stability. Thus we were
looking at 10–15 hours to simulate a single
engagement because computers were slow in
those days. I needed a model that would be able
to run parametric analysis on the Sheridan’s
performance capabilities.
A class of analytic models which were more
theoretical in nature, and primarily of interest
to the academic community, was the Lanchester
differential equations models with coefficients
(‘‘attrition rates’’) no one knew how to estimate
except after an engagement. There were a lot of
theoretical papers written about various forms
of the equations. A square law, a linear law,
a logarithmic law—but they weren’t useful in
real studies. Although the differential equa-
tions proposed by Lanchester had many prob-
lems, their simplicity was appealing.
To do the Sheridan study, I decided I would
try to compute attrition in a small unit combat
engagement using the differential equations
by developing ways to estimate the attrition
rate, a priori. I built simplified models that con-
sidered hit probabilities, firing times, and kill
probabilities to estimate attrition rates. So for
the Sheridan study, I started using what we
think of as Lanchester models. However, based
on doing this simple study it was clear that
a fundamental assumption in the classic Lan-
chester models that the attrition rates are con-
stant is unrealistic if combatants move during
an engagement. For example, consider some of
the parameters I used in estimating the rates
for the study.
The hit probabilities increased the closer
you got to a target. You could detect better as
you got closer to potential targets. Clearly those
parameters and others were changing over time
which suggested the attrition rate had to change
over time during an engagement. Recogniz-
ing this, I performed the study by building a
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simplified scenario involving opposing forces,
and solved the variable coefficient differential
equations numerically for the alternative Sheri-
dan candidates.
After the study was completed, I compared
the results with those achieved by using the
classical Lanchester constant-coefficient for-
mulation, using various ‘‘average’’ coefficients
calculated with the parameter data. The differ-
ences were quite significant. I had stumbled on
an interesting research area for my dissertation
research at OSU (from 1963–1965), and for later
research areas at the University of Michigan
(1965–1972) and VRI beyond 1972.
As I delved into my dissertation, it was clear
that, not only was the attrition rate a variable as
forces moved about the battlefield, but because
many of the processes I considered in comput-
ing the attrition rates in the Sheridan study were
stochastic in nature (firing accuracy, firing times,
target detection, etc.), then the attrition rate was
also stochastic. If you think about the concept
of a stochastic attrition rate that varied over
time, the differential equations became variable
coefficient (sometime nonlinear) stochastic dif-
ferential equations. Recognizing the extreme dif-
ficulty in trying to solve these formulations in
finite time, I made some tactical decisions to
proceed with the dissertation: I would develop
models to estimate the probability distribution
of attrition rates as a function of the fundamen-
tal performance characteristics of a weapon
system. I would then suppress the stochastic
aspects by using some statistic from the distribu-
tion as the variable attrition rates in the variable
coefficient differential equation formulations.
In the 1964 time period, I assumed that the
expected value of the attrition rate random vari-
able was an appropriate statistic to use in the
differential equations. In 1967, using some ar-
guments from renewal theory and Blackwell’s
theorem, my colleagues at Michigan demon-
strated that the time-to-kill a target, not the
rate, was the relevant random variable, and
that a theoretically sound definition of the attri-
tion rate is the reciprocal of the expected time
to kill a target. Bernie Barfoot (Charles Bernard
Barfoot) from the Center for Naval Analyses
(CNA) made a similar observation in 1969
using some harmonic mean and Markov chain
arguments.
During the 1963–1965 period, I did some
interesting theoretical work on the variable co-
efficient differential equations, particularly look-
ing at the impact of movement of forces during
an engagement. The military has known for
years that mass is a nonlinear force multiplier
in combat. Some of my research suggested that
attacking with sufficient speed also is a nonlin-
ear force multiplier and, along with mass, can
be used to rapidly saturate a defender’s retalia-
tory capability.
As an interesting but scary aside, sometime
in 1964 I read an abstract in the Defense Technical
Information Center (DTIC) by George Gamow,
the famous physicist, summarizing work he
was doing on variable coefficient differential
equations for the DoD. I saw my dissertation
fly out the window! Fortunately, when I received
and read the report, it described some military
activities that could be modeled by the equations
but ended up concluding that they were very
difficult to solve.
As part of the dissertation, I developed
models of the time-to-kill probability distribu-
tions for armored weapon systems and thus
their associated attrition rates. This involved
some fundamental process modeling of the sys-
tem’s doctrine for attacking targets and included
its detection, firing, readjustment of fires, lethal-
ity and other performance capabilities against
various type targets.
During the same period (1963–1965) I con-
tinued to run the Fort Knox project, referred to
as The Tank Weapon System project in which
we were developing and integrating models to
predict the performance characteristics of pro-
posed armored systems, including the inter-
actions among them. These were intended to
assess the feasibility of achieving the capabil-
ities and to feed these parameters into the
differential models of combat to assess the
effectiveness of proposed alternative armored
systems.
Bob Sheldon: Who helped you come up with
these variables?
Seth Bonder: A combination of sources. By
reviewing available experimental data; by work-
ing with armored officers at Fort Knox who
were writing requirements for future armored
systems; by talking to other Army analysts like
Hunter Woodall and Dave Hardison; and by
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reading historical accounts of military engage-
ments. Many of the parameters highlighted
earlier were included in the attrition rates, in-
cluding the lethality of munitions which we
had to estimate through some modeling.
Obviously, the lethality of fire was an im-
portant dimension in a tank’s capability to de-
feat a target. This was one of BRL’s areas of
expertise. We needed to be able to predict the
probability of a kill given a hit, and other related
lethality parameters. BRL was working on models
of these parameters. They had developed sophis-
ticated computer programs that fired rounds into
a tank at four inch squares, assessed damage to
components behind it, and computed the rele-
vant kill probabilities.
I asked them if we could transfer the pro-
gram to OSU. They said to me, ‘‘You couldn’t
program this in OSU’s computers in less than
a year.’’ I said, ‘‘Why don’t you give it to me
anyway. We’ll try it.’’ Remember, some of my
researchers were students and some were fac-
ulty. I went back home and said to one of my
student researchers named Dick Freedman,
who was an absolutely fantastic computer pro-
grammer, ‘‘Dick, I just came from BRL. They
gave me their vulnerability program and said
it would take at least four months for us to con-
vert it.’’ He took this as a challenge and had it
running in eight weeks. And he enhanced it
by improving the computational algorithms for
the normal distribution. The students I hired
were very smart.
I completed my dissertation and graduated
from OSU in 1965. The five years I spent at
OSU were the beginning of my professional
life in military OR. I had become acquainted
with many Army OR analysts and familiar
with many of the Army’s tactical-level plan-
ning problems. It was the start of the research
that eventually led to the Bonder-Farrell dif-
ferential equations of combat and eventually
the VECTOR series of campaign models.
When I left in 1965, the Fort Knox project
wasn’t completed. I turned that over to Gordon
Clark who had just returned from the Marine
Corps to get his PhD. He took a totally differ-
ent approach for more analytic effectiveness
models. He built the Dynamic Tactics Simula-
tion (DYNTACS), a Monte Carlo simulation
whose outputs fed the Combat Analysis model
(COMAN) which was one of the first fitted-
parameter analytic combat models. It was a
very interesting concept. It was a competitive
approach to mine. Where mine was purely
analytic, with independently calculated input
parameters, he fit parameters from his Monte
Carlo simulation of combat for use in the
COMAN model. Two different approaches to
analytical combat modeling.
When I graduated, I was going to go to in-
dustry to make some money. I was so broke
as a PhD student making $3,000 a year that in
my last year as a graduate student I decided to
ask for a substantial raise. My advisor said,
‘‘What do you want?’’ I said, ‘‘I want $10,000
a year.’’ I was married in 1962 and I had my first
child in 1964. I wanted a raise. The Dean said,
‘‘That’s more than some faculty make. I can’t
give you that much.’’ I said, ‘‘Then I’m going
to quit. I’ll just write my dissertation. I’m not
going to run the project anymore.’’ He said,
‘‘You’re holding a gun to my head.’’ They gave
me the $10,000.
In late 1964, Jack Borsting approached me
about joining the faculty at the Naval Post-
graduate School (NPS) in Monterey. Jack was
then growing its OR department and was hir-
ing a number of new faculty, including Steve
Pollock who later joined me at Michigan. I told
Jack that I was looking for a job in industry.
Bob Sheldon: How did you decide to go to
the University of Michigan?
Seth Bonder: In early 1965 I went to Chrysler
in Detroit to interview for a job. They were in the
defense business as builders of tanks. They
knew what I was doing at OSU, and wanted
me to come up there and start a military OR
group. Prior to going for the interview, one of
the members of my PhD committee, a mathe-
matician named Henry Colson, had a good
friend at the University of Michigan who headed
the Industrial Engineering Department (since
1971 called the Department of Industrial and
Operations Engineering). Henry said, ‘‘You’ve
got to hire this guy. They throw money at him.’’
Universities love professors who bring in money.
He called me and he said, ‘‘Would you inter-
view for a faculty position?’’ I explained I was
not looking for a university job. He volunteered
to pick me up at Chrysler so I could give a semi-
nar in the afternoon.
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So I went to Michigan in the afternoon after
my Chrysler interview. It was intellectually
stimulating. I presented my dissertation at the
seminar and got arguments from some very
strong mathematicians. It was just a fabulous
activity and I thought, ‘‘I can get smarter if
I come here for a few years.’’ On the way back
to the airport, the Department Chair offered
me a job as an assistant professor and I would
become an associate in a year or two. That was
a pretty good job offer and it was for all of
$16,000 for a nine-month year. I accepted the
job offer on the way back to the airport. When
I got home, I told my wife and she said, ‘‘I
thought we were going to industry.’’ I said,
‘‘I thought we were too, but now we’re going
to the University.’’ My wife had been a cheer-
leader at OSU so going to Michigan was like go-
ing into enemy territory.
I joined the faculty at the University of
Michigan in 1965. I’d never taught before. The
first year all I did was write course materials.
The first semester I was asked to start a new
course to teach linear programming for juniors
and to teach a senior level inventory control
course. Through the period 1965–1972, I taught
a spectrum of OR courses, developed a three-
course sequence in decision theory, and started
a course to teach students how to model oper-
ational phenomena—later referred to as the
‘‘Modeling Studio.’’
Mike Garrambone: Did you use Saul Gass’
book for the linear programming course?
Seth Bonder: No. With few exceptions I
usually taught courses using my own notes
and, if they existed, made textbooks available
as references for the students. In those days
there clearly weren’t any texts to teach model-
ing. I can’t be sure, but I believe my course in
modeling may have been the first of its kind
since I was attempting to teach students the
art of modeling operational processes (leading
to the name ‘‘modeling studio’’). There were
courses with the word modeling in the title,
but they were teaching linear programming
models, inventory models, etc., not the pro-
cess of modeling operational phenomena. Do-
ing so is not easy. In fact, my first couple of
attempts were failures, but I think I got it right
the third time. The students learned how to
start with very simplifying assumptions for
their initial version of a model and how to
remove them through a series of enhancements
until they had a version that could be used
to address the decision issue I posed to start
the process. They worked on a number of
these in a semester, with individual critiques
from me.
It was a demanding, time-consuming activ-
ity for one course. It also was a little frustrating
in that I couldn’t describe what I ‘‘covered’’ in
the course. In a linear programming course
you cover the simplex algorithm, duality, etc;
in a queueing course you cover M/M/1 queues,
etc; in a decision theory course you cover deci-
sions under risk, utility theory, Bayesian updat-
ing, strategy development, etc. I finally figured
out that I wasn’t covering material but rather
was providing the students mentored experi-
ence in the art of modeling operational phenom-
ena. I was pleased to learn a few years ago that
the number of such courses has grown in engi-
neering and business OR programs around the
country.
At the end of the first year, the Department
Chairman said, ‘‘I’ve got money. If you want to
do some research over the summer, I’ll pay for
it.’’ I formed a little research group which I
eventually turned into the Systems Research
Laboratory (SRL) at Michigan. I hired some
grad students, one of whom happened to be
Bob Farrell. Bob was then a 21-year-old typist
in the Department Chair’s office. One of my col-
leagues said to me, ‘‘You ought to hire this guy.
He’s really bright.’’ I said, ‘‘So why’s he typ-
ing?’’ Anyway, he joined me. Over the summer
I and 10 graduate students developed a long-
term research strategy for Michigan’s new
Highway Safety Research Institute.
Just a little aside on Bob. This was 1966.
He was getting his PhD in theoretical math. In
the previous year, he claimed to have solved
the well-known Four Color Problem analyti-
cally. And as best I understood, they accepted
it. Then three weeks later, he proved he was
wrong. If I were in that department, I would
have given him the degree for that proof. Well,
they didn’t give him a degree. Then when he
joined me as part of the research faculty in
1966, he started taking the comprehensive
exams in the Department of Statistics without
ever taking any of the coursework. On his own
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he had learned graduate-level probability and
statistics. The next year he wrote a dissertation.
His two advisors were Bill Ericson and, I
think, Floyd Hill. They both had been students
of Savage, a pioneer in Bayesian statistics re-
search. They said, ‘‘It’s a great dissertation
except it’s not for Bob Farrell. He’s too smart.
He’s got to do more.’’ So he quit and never re-
ceived a PhD. But he was, without a doubt, the
brightest man I’ve ever known—immeasurable
IQ, unbelievable individual and wonderful to
work with. He was a close collaborator, partner,
antagonist, and friend for over 30 years.
Anyway, Bob joined my SRL Lab in 1966.
The first project was a contract out of Redstone
to do some missile air defense simulation
modeling and another out of Rock Island Ar-
senal to do some air defense gun modeling.
Then I obtained a contract with Office of Na-
val Research (ONR) to continue the research
I started at OSU on analytic models of combat.
I also received a contract from the Army
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff’s (AVCS) office in
the Pentagon. My contacts in that office were
Dick Trainor and John Honig. John was then
and has been very active in MORS for many
years. The AVCS was Lieutenant General Bill
DePuy who, as I will comment on later, played
an important role in my professional life. Many
officers in the AVCS office became generals later
in their careers, including Max Thurman, Dave
Maddox, and others.
The ONR and AVCS contracts with the SRL
were to continue my theoretical work on the
analytic models of combat. It involved a broad
spectrum of research on tactical-level combat
operations. It also included building predictive
models of attrition rates for different weapon
systems. Not just tanks but infantry systems,
for helicopters, for artillery, for various other
weapon systems. It included expanding the
differential models of combat to represent mul-
tiple types of systems in combat operations—
multiple systems on one side and multiple
systems on the other side. We expanded the
concept of the attrition rate to the attrition co-
efficient to include the allocation of fires among
different targets. The latter included one of my
student’s theoretical research with differential
game theory for his dissertation to determine
the optimal way to allocate fires across enemy
forces. We expanded the target acquisition
process to include line of sight (LOS) effects,
visual pinpoint detection and false targets.
There were models of other combat processes,
all of which fed into the attrition coefficient
which, in turn, fed into expanded differential
models of combat. That work took place from
1966 through 1972 in the SRL. Much of this re-
search was documented in an extensive report
for ONR and the AVCS office—referred to as
the ‘‘Bible.’’
Bob Sheldon: This laboratory was at the Uni-
versity?
Seth Bonder: Yes. It was part of the Industrial
and Operations Engineering Department of
the University of Michigan. The SRL included
a number of bright PhD students (including
Peter Cherry, George Miller, and some military
officers), a cadre of masters students (including
David Thompson), and some faculty (including
Ralph Disney, a superb stochastic process re-
searcher). Bob Farrell was a full-time research
scientist in the lab.
During my time at Michigan, I also did
some consulting for industry. One of my clients
was the Chrysler Defense Group in Detroit.
They asked me to work with them four days a
month for a couple of years as they prepared
to bid on the next generation tank system. Al-
though I had not consulted before, one of my
senior colleagues said my rate should be $300
per day. Senior management at Chrysler said
that was way too high. So I offered them an al-
ternative: I would work four days a month until
the program was awarded (which could have
been 3–4 years) for free, but if they won the
contract (worth billions) I would get a million
dollar bonus. Needless to say, they paid the rate
I originally requested. With the Chrysler work,
I was consulting about 5–6 days per month,
while teaching 1–2 courses, doing research,
managing the research and marketing for the
SRL, guiding about 3–4 PhD dissertations and
some masters students, serving on departmen-
tal committees, teaching summer short courses,
and trying to participate in professional socie-
ties. It was a very busy time in my professional
life.
I would be remiss if I didn’t mention some
of the wonderful faculty colleagues I had at the
University of Michigan. This included Ralph
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Disney, Bob Thrall, Herb Galliher, Dick Wilson,
Walt Hancock, and others who taught me much
about teaching and academic politics. In 1969
I recruited Steve Pollock from NPS who picked
up my modeling and decision theory courses
when I left the University in 1972. Of local rel-
evance here in Virginia, in the late 1960s I ad-
vised a bright assistant professor to move to
the business school since our department was
not going to grow an IT program—his name
is Alan Merten who is now the President of
George Mason University. A wonderful guy who
I understand has done a great job at Mason.
In addition to the extensive research on
land combat, I did some research at Michigan
in the area of search theory with some of my
military students. Bernie Koopman in World
War II developed search theories for the Navy
which I’m sure you’re well aware of. That
was powerful work for sea warfare, but it
wasn’t appropriate for land combat because
of LOS issues.
In the sea, except in rare cases, you always
have LOS to a target although you may not de-
tect it. In land warfare, which is much more
complicated, you may lose your LOS intermit-
tently so you have to start the detection process
over. I had an Air Force major work on this for
his dissertation—the impact of LOS on search
theory and ability to acquire targets. It turns
out the optimal search concepts are quite differ-
ent than the original Koopman research.
Following that we added another dimen-
sion to the search process: What are the conse-
quences if you find a target? There are times
when finding it may be detrimental to your
health. How does that affect your search pro-
cess? That led to another dissertation. Within
a span of four years, I probably had six or seven
dissertations and many master’s theses written
based on the research we did on military opera-
tions in the lab.
Bob Sheldon: Were most of these active duty
officers doing research?
Seth Bonder: No. There were about 25 stu-
dents and faculty doing research in the lab. This
included 5–6 Army, Air Force, and Navy offi-
cers. When I was at Michigan, the Army offered
to send me 30–40 Army students a year. I said,
‘‘There is no way I would take on that many
Army students a year.’’ This was true for a lot
of reasons. One, it was too big an overload for
our department. But more importantly, I thought
since OR was such a burgeoning field, it would
be appropriate for Army soldiers who get edu-
cated in this field to have different perspectives
on it. They should have faculty members other
than me because I had one view on how to do
research and analysis that likely would be dif-
ferent from other faculty members.
They eventually gave contracts to, I think it
was Tulane, and then to NPS in Monterey where
they sent most of the officers. I got two or three
a year from the services. One Navy lieutenant
commander was writing a classified disserta-
tion on fleet air defense. I asked Ervin Kapos
who was then at CNA to serve on the commit-
tee. (I’ll tell you shortly how I met Ervin in 1966.)
This Navy lieutenant commander was al-
most done with his dissertation, but ran out
of time and had to go back to the Navy. Since
I had invested so much time in this research,
I arranged with Jack Borsting for him to go to
NPS to finish his dissertation. But then he got
an offer from Navy Admiral Zumwalt to come
to a new Navy analysis office called OP-96. He
said to me, ‘‘What should I do?’’ I said, ‘‘Well,
we spent a lot of time on this dissertation but,
if I were you, I’d go to Zumwalt. You’ll become
an admiral.’’ Well, he eventually became a two-
star admiral, but never finished the dissertation.
I should backtrack to Ervin Kapos because
I’m bouncing around a bit.
Bob Sheldon: That’s fine. I interviewed Ervin
this summer.
Seth Bonder: My first interaction with MORS
was through Ervin Kapos. I arrived at the Uni-
versity of Michigan in 1965. In 1966, I received
a call from Ervin who said, ‘‘My name is Ervin
Kapos. I’m running a symposium for an orga-
nization called the Military Operation Research
Symposium (later changed to Society) and
would like you to referee the submitted pa-
pers.’’ Stroking my ego, he said he heard I
had high standards and he wanted a quality
symposium. I believe he heard this from a cou-
ple of Army officers who worked with me at
OSU where I did develop some high standards
for analysis and research. (Looking back, I be-
lieve I embedded these standards into the VRI
culture and to other activities in my profes-
sional life.) Being a good academic and not
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understanding the magnitude of the task, I
agreed to review some papers. Big mistake on
both our parts! He sent all the submitted papers
for me to review (I expected 10–20), and I rejected
all but a handful—clearly not enough for a
MORS Symposium. (Knowing Ervin, if he
were the reviewer I’m sure he also would have
rejected most of the papers.) But he had a sym-
posium to run. At his request, I gave him the
top 20 which he included in the symposium.
That’s how I first met Ervin and learned
of MORS. I attended the 1966 symposium in
Monterey and began a long association with
the Society. I joined the Board of Directors in
1967 and became President in 1969. I continued
to work at many of the subsequent meet-
ings and presented some plenary and keynote
speeches over the years. In one of my early key-
notes, I tried to highlight the ‘‘tyranny of num-
bers’’ and ‘‘rubber threat’’ which the Office of
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Program Analysis
and Evaluation (PA&E) used to control the Ser-
vices’ budgets and expenditures. At a later one
I introduced the methodology of ‘‘versatility
planning’’ as a rational alternative to the ‘‘cost-
effectiveness’’ paradigm for defense planning.
(I believe many of the versatility concepts are
now embedded in some of the services and Joint
Chiefs of Staff [JCS] planning approaches.) In
a MORS plenary talk a few years ago I presented
some ‘‘lessons learned’’ for military model build-
ing and analysis based on my 401 years of expe-
rience in the field. I’ve always cherished my time
with MORS and the MORS Board. Early on I
met some very bright dedicated analysts (such
as John Honig, Murray Greyson, Art Stein,
Gene Visco, Joann Langston, John Kettelle,
Clayton Thomas, Jack Borsting, Dave Schrady
and many others) and established some life-
time friendships through MORS.
Bob Sheldon: Are we still in the 1965–1972
period?
Seth Bonder: Yes. A number of key events oc-
curred in the 1965–1972 period which had sig-
nificant impact on my future professional life.
I’ve already mentioned the phone call from
Ervin Kapos which led to a lifelong association
with MORS.
During the 1960s, many individuals in in-
dustry, the Army, and the DoD who were prac-
ticing or wanted to do military operations
analysis were engineers and physicists (even
a few economists!). They had good technical
backgrounds but little formal training or expo-
sure to the concepts, mathematics, and phenom-
enology of military operations analysis (e.g.,
model building, decision analysis, probability
theory and stochastic processes, simulation ex-
periments, combat processes, effectiveness mea-
sures, life cycle cost analyses, etc.). Believing
there was a demand for this type of course, in
the summer of 1967 I started a one-week, 8 hours
per day, short course titled ‘‘Topics in Mili-
tary Operations Research’’ at the University
of Michigan’s continuing education program.
Given the large enrollment the first year, I ex-
tended the course to two weeks in 1968. Along
with some of the other lecturers, I developed
course notes that were 1,000 pages of lectures
on background material and the work I had
been doing in the 1960s on predicting system
performance capabilities, on estimating force
effectiveness, and on how to perform logically
sound analyses. I had approximately 100 stu-
dents attend each year. Dave Maddox attended
in the late 1960s when he was a captain or major.
In addition to offering the course at Michigan,
I taught it at a couple of DoD agencies. If I re-
member correctly, one of them was the Army’s
Virginia-based Systems Analysis Group in 1969–
1970 run by Marion Bryson, and another was
BRL in 1971 or 1972. Although I stopped offering
the course after 1972 when I left the University,
I continue to run into former students who tell
me how useful the course was and how valuable
the course notes have been. I met many interest-
ing folks who were involved in DoD-related ac-
tivities through the course.
Bob Sheldon: Did you ever publish a book
out of it?
Seth Bonder: No, I never made a book out of
it. But a lot of people still have the notes and
use them as reference materials. I noted earlier
that much of the theoretical underpinnings for
the ‘‘Bonder-IUA’’ and subsequent models (dis-
cussed later) were codified in a large SRL report
referred to as the ‘‘Bible.’’ The course notes con-
tain some of this material.
In 1965 I met Wilbur Payne for the first
time. He was the Deputy Under Secretary of the
Army for Operations Research [DUSA (OR)]
and was running the Hawthorne Committee.
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He had obtained my name from an Army officer
who worked for me at OSU. He called me at
Michigan and asked if I would join the com-
mittee which had many senior Army and OSD
members on it. It was a large committee. Proba-
bly because of my lack of knowledge about the
subject, I asked some embarrassing questions
at the first meeting. Wilbur loved it and we be-
came fast friends and continued for the rest of
our professional lives. For many years after this
initial meeting, we spent a lot of time together
working on committees, discussing Army issues,
brainstorming new approaches and methods for
analysis. I tutored him on some new stochastic
process book, and drinking. Over the years we
did a lot of the latter at his houses in Washington,
D.C. and El Paso, Texas, in Juarez, Mexico, and
on temporary duty (TDY) together. Wilbur worked
for me for 2–4 days per month as a VRI Associ-
ate after he retired and until he died in 1990.
Wilbur was bright and dedicated to making
the Army better, and had a unique talent for
getting change to happen in the DoD bureau-
cracy. I learned much from him, and he sur-
faced at many places in my career.
Bob Sheldon: In what way?
Seth Bonder: He was instrumental in my get-
ting involved with the Army Science Board, was
a strong advocate for implementing the new
modeling approaches I developed in my re-
search, and, as I said, was a VRI associate for
a number of years after he retired from govern-
ment service.
While still in the 1965–1972 period, in addi-
tion to my teaching, I directed the SRL at the
University of Michigan which conducted exten-
sive research on military operations, some of
which I discussed earlier. Most of that work
was theoretical in nature with lots of mathemat-
ical formulations. Although our research was
on a spectrum of combat processes, we did not
have a model, per se, to use for analysis of com-
bat issues. In August of 1969, I received a call
from Dick Trainor, who was my sponsor from
the Army’s AVCS office, asking me to meet with
the AVCS, General Bill DePuy (then a three-star
general). I had not met him before, but appar-
ently he had an innate feeling for the power of
analysis.
At the meeting, General DePuy said, ‘‘I’m
having some problems with Mr. Packard (who
was the Deputy Secretary of Defense) on the
new Main Battle Tank (MBT-70). I need some
analysis of the MBT-70 alternatives, but the
Lockheed Corporation wants to charge me an
outrageous amount of money to do the study
using their new IUA simulation model. I under-
stand we’ve been giving you money to build
models of warfare. I want you to use them to
do an analysis to determine the pros and cons
of the MBT-70 for my meeting with Mr. Packard
in mid-November. I want the results by 1
November.’’ I explained I had two problems
with his request: (1) my theoretical research was
to develop mathematics of combat processes—
I did not have a credible model of small unit
land combat to do the study; and (2) the study
is obviously going to be classified and I can’t do
classified research at the University—it had
a moratorium on classified research. DePuy
told me he needed my help so I should use
whatever mathematics I had to do the study,
and that I should start a company to handle
the classified material. I said, somewhat face-
tiously, ‘‘Right, I’ll go start a company.’’
At the end of that week, I had security folks
from the Pentagon come to Ann Arbor to clear
an office in a company that I didn’t have. I didn’t
have an office, and I didn’t have a company. But
that’s how VRI got started. Bill DePuy was the
stimulus behind the founding of VRI, with me,
Bob Farrell, and an economist friend, Dave
Brophy, as the founders. The security people
said, ‘‘We’ll be back next week. Get an office.’’
I went to a friend of mine who had a little
company and he gave me a desk, and I bought
a safe. They came back and said, ‘‘This isn’t
good enough. You have to have an office.’’
I rented a room in a motel-like building and
moved the safe there. (The safe moving process
became a classic traditional story in Vector’s
history.) They cleared the office. Bob and I
moonlighted from our university responsibili-
ties and did the study from September to mid-
November. In addition, since I was President of
MORS at the time, I had to attend the MORS
Symposium in early November.
Bob Sheldon: Interesting way to start a com-
pany. Did you complete the study?
Seth Bonder: Yes, and it became the seed of
my career after teaching and research at the
University. It is interesting to remember this
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stressful three-month study because it gave
rise to the first hybrid analytic-simulation
model of land combat engagements, later re-
ferred to as the Bonder-IUA model. Soon after
the office was cleared, we received descrip-
tions of the different MBT candidates; descrip-
tions of scenarios for six different land combat
engagements involving battalion size forces;
100,000 IBM cards containing performance
data for the different MBT candidates, terrain
data for the scenarios, etc. We began a hectic
process of building a new model of land com-
bat from our theoretical formulations. Bob
wrote code to implement the formulations and
the scenarios (because I can’t type!), and I modi-
fied the mathematics to represent the different
types of weapon systems in the scenarios and
their different firing doctrines.
Then we had to drag boxes of IBM cards
over to the computer center to make some trial
runs with the candidate MBT systems. John
Honig was the government project officer for
the study. He wanted us to verify that our ana-
lytic model would produce results similar to
the IUA simulation before making runs for
analysis of the candidate systems. (I was not
sure why that was a good credibility criterion
for our model.) Our first set of test runs didn’t
match at all—they were way off. I reviewed
our results and believed them to be consistent
with the mathematical structure of our model—
that is, the code that Bob had written was cor-
rectly transforming the model inputs and our
mathematical formulations to output combat
results for the test cases. We reviewed the IUA
simulation code and found numerous program-
ming errors as well as some different decision
logic representations between our model and
the Lockheed simulation. Once these were cor-
rected, we and Lockheed made some new test
runs. John made this a blind comparison—we
provided him with our results which he com-
pared to Lockheed’s. John thought the compar-
ison was good enough to go forward with the
study. That is, the deterministic results of our
hybrid analytic-simulation compared quite well
with the mean of the results from the IUA
Monte Carlo simulation over the six different
engagement scenarios.
Bob Sheldon: Was that like a verification, val-
idation, and accreditation (VV&A) process?
Seth Bonder: Not quite. We did not compare
our results to real combat operations (which is
today’s validation process), but did more than
check to see that the code implemented our
mathematical formulations (which is today’s
verification process). We compared our hybrid
analytic–simulation model’s results to results
from the IUA simulation which led to the Army
approving (this is today’s accreditation process)
our model for use in the study.
In the remaining time we made hundreds
of runs over the six different engagement sce-
narios and analyzed them in our make-shift
motel office. Amidst boxes of pizza, we called
the results into John on a Sunday evening who
then prepared a briefing for General DePuy to
present to Mr. Packard that week. General DePuy
was very pleased with the results and our re-
sponsiveness. John referred to our battalion-
level combat model as the ‘‘Bonder-IUA.’’ Later
he and I wrote a paper describing the study,
presented it at a MORS Symposium, and won
the Rist prize.
The first VRI study in November 1969 was
a success and had many positive downstream
impacts on VRI’s future reputation and growth.
The structures and equations developed in the
SRL and used in the Bonder-IUA (and subse-
quent) models appropriately became known
as the Bonder-Farrell methodology. Because the
methodology and models involve differential
equations, and because Lanchester pioneered
differential equation models of attrition, some
people call these Lanchester models. To the
extent that this is intended as a well-deserved
tribute to a pioneering analyst, this is fine ter-
minology. However the methods of Bonder-
Farrell are synthetic in nature and are quite
different from Lanchester’s, which are holistic
models.
So VRI was formed in 1969 at the impetus
of General DePuy, with me and Bob Farrell as
principals. I moonlighted with VRI for a couple
of years during which we hired some early em-
ployees (most notably David Thompson, George
Miller, Peter Cherry, Dick Freedman and Alan
Weintraub, all of whom worked for the com-
pany for 301 years), and moved into a sizable
office in 1971. Although I was due for a sabbat-
ical, I took a six month leave of absence from
the University the same year. In 1972 I left my
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full-time faculty position at the University of
Michigan, became an Adjunct Professor, and
joined VRI as its full-time Chairman, CEO, and
President. Bob joined as the first Vice President
and Chief Scientist.
Bob Sheldon: After starting Vector, did you
continue activities with the University?
Seth Bonder: I did. I periodically taught
courses in decision theory and the modeling
course after 1972. The period 1960–1972 was fo-
cused in academia and was a busy and pro-
ductive period of my professional OR life. The
period 1972–1989 started the OR business part
of my professional history which, like the previ-
ous period, was affected by many related events
and activities of others.
In 1972, Bill DePuy formed and became the
Commanding General of the Army’s new Train-
ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). In this
role he became the architect of the post-Vietnam
Army, responsible for the planning of all the
Army’s new tactical and operational-level sys-
tems, new force designs (organization and
composition of fighting units), new operational
concepts and doctrine (how units should fight
and be supported), and for schoolhouse train-
ing. And he became a champion of operations
analysis to help him with these responsibilities.
He formed a number of OR analysis groups in
the command: sizable ones at Fort Leavenworth,
White Sands, and Fort Lee; and smaller ones at
many of the branch (e.g., armor, infantry, artillery,
etc.) schools.
Bob Sheldon: Did you provide support to
him?
Seth Bonder: Yes, to him and the command
for many years. At the tactical level of opera-
tions, we (that is, me and my colleagues at
VRI) and the Army analysis community had
extensive experimental, research, and model
building activities to use as a solid base for
conducting analyses at that level. In the early
1970s, VRI began providing analysis support to
TRADOC for the development of new tactical-
level systems such as the M1 tank, the Bradley
fighting vehicle, the Apache helicopter, and
others. We provided analytical support for new
tactics, and the incorporation of new tech-
nologies such as fiber optic, laser-designated,
self-designated precision munitions into new
systems.
Our initial studies for the Army in the early
1970s used the Bonder-IUA model to examine
the impacts of different armored systems on
the outcomes of battalion-level engagements.
Even though we had used it to support Gen-
eral DePuy in his successful negotiations with
Mr. Packard, it was not an easy sell to convince
other senior military and the Army’s analytic
community that it was an appropriate vehicle
for analysis of small unit combat engagements.
The model, which I referred to as a ‘‘hybrid
analytic-simulation model,’’ considered groups
of homogeneous systems (i.e., multiple systems
of a single type all at one location) on the battle-
field and analytically integrated their detection,
firing, accuracy, lethality, and vulnerability sto-
chastic processes to compute attrition deter-
ministically during the course of a battle. It
simulated movement of the groups over the
terrain, command and control of the groups
through decision rules, and LOS computations
between combatants by embedding a digitized
map into the model. This was in contrast to the
Army’s primary model of small unit engage-
ments, Carmonette, which kept track of indi-
vidual systems and explicitly sampled each
of the stochastic processes using Monte Carlo
techniques to develop a distribution of attri-
tion results during the course of the battle. Al-
though both were useful tools, I personally
thought the hybrid model was easier to use in
a study. It ran faster to simulate a battle, did
not require replications, and most importantly,
I thought it was easier to interpret the exten-
sive outputs by referring to the underlying
mathematical formulations. It allowed us to
perform the necessary extensive parametric
and sensitivity analyses during a study.
Bob Sheldon: Were you successful in getting
the Army to use the model?
Seth Bonder: Only with extensive influence
and help from Wilbur Payne, initially in his po-
sition as the DUSA(OR), (the highest level OR
position in the Army), and later when Bill DePuy
made him the Director of the TRADOC Systems
Analysis Agency (TRASANA) at White Sands.
We started doing studies for DePuy and Wilbur
and after a while various Army agencies be-
gan using the Bonder-IUA along with their
other models. Using a ‘‘prototyping process’’ of
model enhancements to conduct studies of new
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systems, technologies, and tactics, VRI and the
government developed a large family of hybrid
analytic-simulation models of battalion-level en-
gagements during the period 1972–1989. A VRI
branch of the developments led to the Battalion
Level Differential Model (BLDM) which was
used at least through 1990 and the Bonder-Farrell
methodology was adapted for use in the JANUS
gaming version which I believe is still being used
today.
I think it is important to remember that this
family of battalion-level models was built on
a strong base of field experimentation (directed
or performed by Army analysts such as Wilbur
Payne, Dave Hardison, E.B. Vandiver, Walt Hollis,
Marion Bryson, Hunter Woodall, and others),
and theoretical research using this experimental
data. They were not built on a ‘‘base of sand’’ as
some military analysts who were not involved
with or aware of the experimentation and re-
search like to publicly broadcast. As we will
discuss shortly, these models later became the
basis for building the VECTOR series and other
campaign models used in the DoD.
While he was still the AVCS, Bill DePuy and
senior leaders in the Air Force, JCS, and OSD
were expressing new interest in operational-
level issues (corps and echelons above corps)—
new operational concepts and doctrine, new
force designs, and new operational-level sys-
tems. This was perhaps driven by the Soviets
focus on the operational level of war as de-
scribed in a number of classified documents.
Efforts were underway to develop or enhance
existing operational-level models that could
consider the effects of combined arms (multiple
army branches) and joint (multiservice) forces
in a large-scale campaign.
Bob Sheldon: What were some of the cam-
paign models?
Seth Bonder: If I remember correctly, there
was IDAGAM (Institute for Defense Analy-
ses Gaming Model) developed by the Insti-
tute for Defense Analyses (IDA). This later
became TACWAR (Tactical Warfare simulation)
that used an eigenvalue methodology to assess
attrition in large unit battles. And there was
ATLAS run by RAC which in the early 1970s
used a FPS approach to assess attrition and
movement of major units. Because of DePuy’s
interest in operational-level issues in 1970, we
did some research in the SRL at Michigan on
the possibility of cascading our battalion-level
combat methodology into a campaign model.
In early 1971, I received a telephone call
from Air Force Lt Gen Glenn Kent, who was
then the Director of the Weapons Systems Eval-
uation Group (WSEG), an OSD agency that I
believe served as the military side of IDA. He
said he had heard of my modeling research
efforts and wanted my opinion on some of the
ongoing campaign model development efforts.
At a subsequent meeting I told him I thought
the IDAGAM eigenvalue approach led to some
very unstable attrition predictions and that the
FPS approach used in ATLAS was an unscien-
tific hypothetical construct that was not credible
to assess the utility of future systems or forces.
I think he agreed with me, but then out of the
blue said he wanted me to go to Europe for
about six weeks on an intelligence related task
for the Secretary of Defense. I told him I thought
it would be interesting, but couldn’t do it since
I had just taken a leave from the University to
get a new company off the ground. He said
he wanted me to go and would have some
campaign modeling work for me to do when
I returned.
Bob Sheldon: What did he think your qualifi-
cations were for the European task?
Seth Bonder: I had no idea then but after the
fact believe he thought I had sufficient techni-
cal training in OR and reasonable knowledge
in the state of the art in military OR modeling
and analysis. (Glenn has confirmed that the
project and associated reports discussed below
were declassified many years ago.)
The project involved interrogation of a de-
fector from one of the Warsaw Pact nations
who claimed to be a military OR analyst knowl-
edgeable in Pact and Soviet modeling and anal-
ysis activities. I went to Europe with two other
individuals—one from the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and one from the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency (DIA)—to assess his credibility
and learn what we could about the Pact’s anal-
ysis capabilities and analyses. We operated out
of the Fifth Corps HQ (the I. G. Farben build-
ing) in Frankfurt and met with the defector at
some safe house daily. The other two analysts
(clearly intelligence; not OR) worked with me
only part of the time I was there. During our
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discussions, I tried to evaluate his technical OR
capabilities, his knowledge of Pact and Soviet
OR analysis methodologies, his knowledge
of ongoing studies, and other topics I thought
would be of interest to the DoD. Although he
had some superficial knowledge about US tools,
(e.g., Carmonette and my attrition rate work),
his technical capabilities were light, and his
knowledge about Soviet studies was limited
to artillery firing table developments. I believed
he had very limited access to what the Soviets
were actually doing. I drafted my report to
Glenn on the weekends at an office in the Farben
building.
Although it sounds like a benign assign-
ment, I should have asked Glenn for hazardous
duty pay due to the Baader-Meinhof gang. One
night I was evacuated from the VIP quarters
due to a bomb threat. A bomb exploded at the
front of the Farben building hours before my
morning jog past the building, and a bomb ex-
ploded near the Officers’ Club one day which
blew out all the windows on the backside of
the Farben building.
Bob Sheldon: How long were you in Europe
on this task?
Seth Bonder: It was a little less than the six
weeks Glenn thought it would. When I returned
and debriefed him, General Kent later asked
me to start a program to build a campaign
model that didn’t rely on the techniques used
in IDAGAM or ATLAS, but was more related to
the work I had done in developing the battalion-
level models. I thought this was appropriate
since, as I noted earlier, our models had stron-
ger linkages to extensive field experimentation
and related research.
While still in the SRL, I, Bob Farrell, and
a couple of others had given some thought
to nesting or embedding the hybrid analytic-
simulation battalion-level models inside a cam-
paign model to compute the land warfare results
during a campaign. (This is in contrast to the hi-
erarchy approach used later in CEM [Concepts
Evaluation Model] whereby land combat attri-
tion data are input to the campaign model for
many different situations based on runs of a
separate ground combat model). Bob thought
we would have some major computational prob-
lems in doing so. A campaign could involve
a number of corps-size units on the friendly
side, with each corps containing about 25 battal-
ions. Recall the Bonder-IUA (and all succeeding
ones in the differential family) had an embed-
ded digitized map of the terrain which was used
to locate and move system groups and to com-
pute the duration of LOS dynamically between
all potential shooters and targets. The latter was
a major share of the run time for a single battal-
ion engagement. Bob estimated that it would
require eons to compute LOS in this fashion
for a large scale campaign. We needed a way
to analytically represent LOS in a campaign
model rather than try to simulate it as we had
in the battalion models. We considered the fol-
lowing logic:
As a shooter moves around a battlefield,
he will have a specific realization of LOS win-
dows as he approaches a target. If he takes a
slightly different path, he will have a different
realization of LOS windows. Slight variations
in attack paths produce different realizations
of LOS windows. Although in planning stud-
ies we usually script specific attack paths, we
don’t know what attack routes will actually
be used in a future combat operation, even if
it is on the exact piece of terrain used in a plan-
ning study. Accordingly, we can think of these
as realizations from some underlying LOS sto-
chastic process. Conceptually, as any shooter
approaches a target there is some probability
that he will obtain LOS with a potential target
and the duration of that LOS is a random variable
described by some probability distribution. One
might expect that the distribution would have
different statistics as the range between shooter
and target change. Given this simplified logic
and a couple of assumptions, one might mathe-
matically characterize the LOS process as a non-
stationary Renewal Process.
About the same time, Bob (and I believe
Wilbur Payne) conducted an extensive analy-
sis of the LOS data generated in the TETAM
(Tactical Effectiveness Testing of Antitank Mis-
siles) experiments. (The TETAM experiments
were conducted by Marion Bryson at the Com-
bat Developments Experimentation Command
[CDEC] and I believe Dave Hardison, based on
observing in an earlier experiment that there
were a reasonable number of 30001 meter LOS
in Europe, developed the tube-launched, opti-
cally tracked, wire-guided [TOW] long-range
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missile.) Bob’s analysis suggested that the LOS
process could reasonably be approximated by
a Markov Renewal Process with parameters that
varied with range to the target. We developed the
mathematics to integrate LOS into an extended
version of the Bonder-Farrell methodology and
procedures for estimating the LOS parameters
(mean LOS, mean non-LOS windows) from dig-
itized maps of a battlefield area. Subsequent tests
using digitized LOS in the Bonder-IUA model
with a version that used the analytic LOS for-
mulation produced comparable combat results.
Bob Sheldon: When did you develop the first
campaign model under the program with Gen-
eral Kent?
Seth Bonder: Based on my experience with
the battalion-level models, my approach to build-
ing models was (and is) quite different from
what I see in the community today. Using many
simplifying assumptions, I believe an initial
prototype should be built as quickly as possi-
ble, used in studies, and enhanced (continual
removal of simplifying assumptions) based
on those studies and the needs for future stud-
ies. I guess in today’s vernacular it would be
called a ‘‘prototyping’’ development process.
I can’t prove it, but I believe the recent JSIMS
(Joint Simulation System) model development
program failed (at a cost of 1–2 billion dollars)
because it didn’t follow this type of approach.
Starting in 1972, the first prototype ver-
sion, originally called the BATTLE (Battalion
Through Theater Level Engagement) model
but soon changed to VECTOR-0, was devel-
oped in 10 months. It included the effects of
some air operations but was primarily a land
warfare model. It was used to address some
issues for General Kent. I like to tell a little
story about one of my interactions with Glenn
in this time period.
Bob Farrell and I met with him to discuss
results of one of the issues we were looking at
with VECTOR-0. Glenn has a wonderful se-
mantic technique for boring in on study results
(and the briefer!). We were arguing back and
forth about a particular result which was not
intuitive to him when he said something like
‘‘no, no, no, you don’t understand.’’ Sitting on
the side, Bob shrugged his shoulders. Glenn
whirled on him, and said ‘‘Don’t look at me like
I’m a stupid general,’’ and went to the white
board to make his point. At the board he
stopped, thought for a moment, understood
the point I was trying to make and said
‘‘I guess I am a stupid general.’’ Obviously
nothing could be further from the truth—he’s
one of the smartest military analysts I’ve known,
but confident enough as a senior military leader
and analyst to admit to missing a subtle result.
In our subsequent discussion we agreed that
the validity of a planning study’s results should
not be based solely on agreement with one’s
intuition because an individual’s intuition is
based on his or her past experience. Valid model-
based analysis about future operations may
appear counterintuitive initially, but eventually
can be used to enhance one’s intuition about
complex operations.
The issues we addressed for General Kent
served as a basis for developing VECTOR-1
in 1974 which added some rear area opera-
tions. Using this prototyping process, a lineage
of VECTOR campaign models was developed
from 1974 to 1990, including VECTOR-1 Nuclear,
VECTOR-2 (which enhanced the rear area rep-
resentations, including complete joint air oper-
ations), VECTOR-2 SWASIA (Southwest Asia),
VECTOR-3 (which added complete joint logis-
tical operations, including intratheater airlift),
VECTOR-3 intelligence and electronic warfare
(IEW), and other versions as needed to address
relevant military decisions. New code was writ-
ten and new documentation prepared with each
new major version. This codified all the changes
made to the earlier version as it was used in stud-
ies and all the new content (entities, processes,
etc.) added to create the new version.
Bob Sheldon: When you added logistics, did
it include munitions?
Seth Bonder: Yes, for all service systems. It
included all classes of supplies, transshipment
of supplies, maintenance activities, and all other
activities of a logistical system integrated with
combat operations.
Bob Sheldon: Did the VECTOR models go
through the VV&A process?
Seth Bonder: I don’t think so, but let me tell
you what I do know regarding the VECTOR
models and that process. In the early 1990s,
VECTOR-3 was accredited by TRADOC Analy-
sis Center (TRAC) or Walt Hollis for VRI to do
some deep strike studies that were mandated
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by Congress. Perhaps more significantly, in
1982 I directed a study for the CIA in which
VECTOR-2 was successfully blind tested against
the 1973 Golan Heights campaign (before per-
forming a Mideast balance analysis for the
same sponsor). This was what I believe would
be called a validation study in that we compared
the results of VECTOR-2 when it simulated the
Golan Heights campaign to historical results of
that campaign. I believe that study produced
two useful results for the military OR commu-
nity and profession.
I believe it is the first campaign model that
has been ‘‘validated’’ against real-world mili-
tary operations and the study provided a logical
methodology for doing so. VECTOR-2 is a de-
terministic model which produces a single,
central-value realization of a simulated war drawn
from some underlying simulation stochastic pro-
cess. I expected that we would be comparing
this to a single realization of the actual war
drawn from some underlying real-war stochas-
tic process. It turned out that there were eight
different reports of how the war unfolded (i.e.,
unit locations, attrition, etc. over the course of
the war). There were two classified reports and
six unclassified ones. (I’m not sure if anyone
can ever really determine how a war unfolded.)
From a methodological perspective we treated
the eight reports as eight realizations of the un-
derlying stochastic process of the real war and
tested the hypothesis that the VECTOR-2 reali-
zation came from the same underlying stochas-
tic process. It was a blind test in that we did
not see any of the eight realizations until the
comparisons were made. As input, the CIA pro-
vided us with system capabilities, force lists
and how each side (Israelis and Syrians) would
employ them.
The comparisons suggested that there was
no reason to reject the hypothesis that the dy-
namics of the VECTOR-2 simulated war was
similar to the dynamics of the actual Golan
Heights campaign. From a broader perspective
for the military OR profession (not just the
VECTOR models), the results verify (or do not
reject) our implicit hypothesis that we can
model the operations of large-scale military
conflict. About the same time AMSAA was test-
ing one of their division-level models (which I
believe used the Bonder-Farrell methodology
to assess ground combat operations) against
similar data.
Bob Sheldon: You modeled the weapon sys-
tem capability. Did you model the difference
in the capabilities of the various countries’
ground fighters like Trevor Dupuy did in his
Historical Evaluation and Research Organiza-
tion (HERO) model?
Seth Bonder: VRI and Mathematica had
a contract to review the sources of the HERO
data and its statistical methods years ago. At
that time I thought the HERO model content
was spurious so don’t want to discuss how he
represented different countries. In this vali-
dation study, the CIA provided us with the
systems’ capabilities as used by the different
combatants. In the first iteration of compari-
sons, they neglected to tell us that a Syrian
tank crew would abandon their tank if a shot
fired at them was a near miss or hit their tank
but didn’t cause any damage. The CIA counted
that as a killed tank and thus estimated signifi-
cantly more Syrian losses that we did. The com-
parisons were much better when we simulated
the same Syrian behavior.
Although the VECTOR models have not
gone through the formal VV&A process, the sto-
chastic LOS version of the Bonder-Farrell attri-
tion methodology used in the VECTOR models
has been used by other modelers in campaign
models such as Vector-in-Commander (VIC),
STAR, Eagle, and most recently the Joint War-
fare Simulation (JWARS) model. I believe some
of these have been through the VV&A process.
I was surprised to learn recently that some
models are still using a form of FPS methods
to assess land combat results.
Returning to my association with General
Kent, he was a wonderful sponsor for the de-
velopment of the VECTOR campaign models.
He had great insight and vision as to the kinds
of models needed to support the DoD. We main-
tained our professional association after he left
WSEG. It was always a pleasure to occasionally
see him at various meetings. The next director
of WSEG was Admiral Ed Waller who was
charged with closing the WSEG. A smart mil-
itary man but not analytically oriented like
Glenn. During Ed’s tenure, I used to meet with
him for breakfast once a month and spend an
hour teaching him the basics of decision theory.
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They were enjoyable sessions since I really do like
teaching.
Bob Sheldon: Let me backtrack a bit. Where
did the name Vector come from?
Seth Bonder: I’m not sure whether you mean
the company name or the name of the cam-
paign models, but let me comment on both.
In selecting a name for the company, we wanted
something with a mathematical connotation.
After exploring a number of the obvious Greek
letters (the Alpha Corp, etc.), Vector was sug-
gested. We all liked it since it not only had the
magnitude and direction associated with a math-
ematical vector, but also the n-dimensionality of
a vector. Our VRI logo (created by one of my grad
students, my secretary, and me) contains associ-
ated vector line segments (the arrows) and a
mathematical vector dot product. My friendly
competitor Dan McDonald from BDM used to
say, ‘‘They don’t know which way they are
going—up, down, or sideways.’’
As noted earlier, the original name created
by Bob Farrell was the BATTLE (Battalion
Through Theater Level Engagement) model
which was a perfect acronym. But I changed
it to VECTOR to get visibility for our new and
very small company. In 1972 I think we had eight
employees. At that time I did not have any
growth plans or desires, but wanted to build
our reputation as a high quality, innovative re-
search and analysis company that could help
address potential clients’ most difficult deci-
sion problems. That philosophy continued un-
til 1988–1989 when I had to establish specific
growth plans.
Before continuing with my professional his-
tory in the 1972–1989 time period, I think it is
important to note a somewhat random event
in 1972 that led to some of VRI’s downstream
growth. That year, strictly on a whim, I responded
to a Commerce Business Daily Request for Pro-
posal (RFP) for an analysis of national nurse
supply and demand issues. I knew very little
about the area. Probably the worst proposal
I have ever written, but (of course) we were
awarded the contract. That got VRI into the
health-related business. I hired an Army Medical
Corps captain, Tim Doyle, to run the contract and
build that side of the business. Over time he de-
veloped significant OR, econometric, and in-
formation technology (IT) and database work
with the Military Health System. I did not get
deeply involved with VRI’s health business until
1994–1995, surprisingly enough at the request of
General Max Thurman. More on that later.
Although we were getting some support
from Bill DePuy to do small tactical-level stud-
ies, and from Glenn Kent to work on the devel-
opment of campaign models, I did not know,
and was not known by, the senior-level Army
planning and operations community. In 1975,
General DePuy set in motion activities for an
Armor/Anti-Armor Systems Program Review
(AASPR) with all the Army’s senior leadership
to review plans for new major armor programs.
All the analyses for that program review were
being conducted at the Combined Arms Cen-
ter in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. About three
months before the review, General DePuy asked
me to meet him at Leavenworth to see what MG
Cushman (the Commanding General [CG] of
Fort Leavenworth) was doing in preparation
for the AASPR. He and a couple of majors pre-
sented some slides with the worst analytic
gibberish I had ever seen. General DePuy asked
me ‘‘What do you think?’’ I said, ‘‘I think he
has no idea what he is doing and may be having
a strong negative effect on preparation for the
AASPR.’’ Bill asked me to spend a little time
with Colonel Reed Davis who was directing
analyses in preparation for the AASPR with
another analysis group at Leavenworth, and
to attend the major review.
The AASPR was attended by a cast of
thousands—a few Army four-stars, some three-
stars, a host of two- and one-stars, and a large
number of other Army military officers and ci-
vilians. It was so large that only the senior lead-
ership were seated in the main presentation
room, while the others watched on TVs in ad-
joining rooms where I had planned to be. When
General DePuy arrived with his entourage, he
beckoned me to join him saying, ‘‘I have a seat
for you.’’ I thought that was nice of him. Little
did I realize how nice—I sat with him and Gen-
eral Kerwin, then the Army’s Vice Chief of
Staff. Bill introduced me to a large number of
the current and future Army senior leadership
and set the image that I was someone who,
through quality analyses and consulting, could
be helpful to that leadership. I believe Bill pur-
posely did this to help me and VRI.
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At that meeting and subsequent ones, I met
Army officers who became clients and eventu-
ally lifetime friends such as Generals Max and
Roy Thurman, Glenn Otis, Dave Maddox, John
Foss, Jack Merritt, Ted Stroup, Paul Gorman,
Gordon Sullivan, and others. He provided
the entre´e for VRI to perform work for many
TRADOC agencies, other organizations in the
Army, and the leadership at Department of
Army (DA) Headquarters in the 1972–1989
time period. Using the VECTOR series models
(including one that had player interaction capa-
bilities), I studied a broad range of operational-
level issues in the 1972–1989 period, including
operational concepts and doctrine (e.g., AirLand
Battle doctrine), new operational organizations
(e.g., Division-86, the Light Division, Army-86,
the Army of Excellence), and operational-level
systems (e.g., the Army Tactical Missile System
[ATACMS], the Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System [JSTARS]).
Bob Sheldon: How many studies were you
involved with during this time period? Do you
have any favorite ones?
Seth Bonder: Not counting my Army Science
Board work, prior to 1989 (when we switched to
quick response analyses) I would estimate that
I technically directed or closely oversaw five to
six projects per year at VRI for the Army, other
DoD agencies, and industry, so probably 75–80
from 1975 to 1988. Many were studies and some
model development projects. VRI had great tech-
nical professionals to work with which made
this workload feasible and stimulating. Even
with my business development and managerial
responsibilities, I tried to spend at least 30 % of
my time working on technical projects (based
on my usual 70–75 hour weeks). I was never
a believer of having separate marketing and
production staffs. In an analysis firm, I always
thought that technical folks should be inter-
facing with potential clients to determine what
was needed to help with their decision issues
and to assess what was feasible to achieve in
the allotted time. I believe the pure business
developer did not have these capabilities.
I really liked doing analyses for clients, so
many were favorites. I tried to make sure that
the VRI studies and development projects were
useful, useable, and used by the clients. I particu-
larly liked those in which I not only helped the
client with his decision issues, but learned
something about operational phenomena. Some
examples during this period might illustrate
the point. Through Glenn Kent I met Jasper
Welch at the Air Force Studies and Analysis
Agency (AFSAA) when he was a Colonel. Later
when he was a one-star and I believe the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense (ASD)-Atomic Energy,
he asked me to do ‘‘something bright’’ for the
Defense Nuclear Agency, an agency which had
a small set of favored contractors that did not
include me. At that time the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy against a
Soviet offensive in Europe was to try to stop
penetration of the Inter-German Border (IGB)
conventionally and if that failed, use tactical
nuclear weapons to stop the penetration. We
thought it would be useful to understand and
perhaps develop some good nuclear targeting
priorities. In doing the study we developed the
targeting priorities for our nuclear systems. In
addition, this study in conjunction with a cou-
ple of others, gave rise to a powerful insight
about tactical nuclear operations which I thought
brought the whole NATO strategy for European
defense into question. So did Jasper. (I can’t de-
scribe the specific insight because I don’t know
if the study has been declassified.) Jasper asked
me to brief the SACEUR (Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe) within a couple of weeks. The
study was useful to the DoD and I developed
some insights regarding the interactions be-
tween tactical nuclear and conventional war-
fare operations.
As another example, in doing a number
of studies for General DePuy during the early
1970s, we analyzed a large number of simulated
US battalion-level defensive engagements against
an attacking Soviet force. We observed that the
instantaneous loss exchange ratio (LER) – the ratio
of the rates of attacker and defender losses –
was very high and relatively independent of
the threat size early in the battle because of con-
cealment and first shot advantages accrued to
the defender. The LER advantage moves to the
attacker as the forces become more decisively
engaged and the concentration and saturation
phenomena come into play for the attacker. This
suggested that an indepth use of a large number
of small-unit engagements in which defenders
get off a small number of shots (operate at the
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high end of the LER) and then fall back to pre-
pared positions to repeat the process would be
an effective tactic for Europe. In essence, to pre-
vent a Soviet penetration, the concept was to
trade ground for high attrition of the attacker
while continually increasing the density of the
defensive positions. I subsequently wrote a pa-
per describing this as a ‘‘Variable-Density’’ de-
fense. One of my colleagues convinced me this
would not be a good acronym, so I changed it
to the ‘‘Dynamic Density’’ defense. General
Shy Meyer who was the CG of the 3rd Infantry
Division (ID) in Europe at the time (later be-
came the Army’s Chief of Staff) thought that
he could find a large number of such fall-back
positions in his sector to make the concept
work. I believe Bill DePuy used these ideas as
the basis for his Active Defense concept. The
study helped the client, and I learned some-
thing about combat operations.
Bob Sheldon: Sounds like you and General
DePuy had a good working relationship.
Seth Bonder: We did and it blossomed into
a lifetime friendship after he retired in 1977.
When he retired he wanted to do some con-
sulting for VRI. I told him we needed to wait
a year to avoid any misperceptions related to
our contractual work with TRADOC. After 9
months of consulting with some of my compet-
itors, he complained that they never gave him
substantive work to do—he would spend mini-
mal time on a large number of proposals and
projects each consulting day so they could use
his name for marketing purposes. He became
a VRI Associate shortly thereafter, working two
to four days per month until a year or two be-
fore he died in 1992. Most often he would come
to our Ann Arbor office (he loved walking
around the University’s campus). He’d walk
in, salute, and say: ‘‘Reporting for duty.’’ He
would help fix a project that was having some
difficulties, help structure a new project, or the
two of us would work on an important issue
for the Army. He often prepared papers de-
scribing the work he did on fixing and structur-
ing projects or think pieces on Army and Joint
service issues – products not often provided
by senior military consultants. He was the first
member and Chairman of my small Advisory
Board (AB) that I formed, not only to review
ongoing programs, but to serve as a sounding
(more often pinging) board on how I was man-
aging and leading the company.
Bob Sheldon: Was all of your work at VRI
for the federal government?
Seth Bonder: Initially yes, but through con-
tacts I made at the ASB, MORS, and other meet-
ing venues, we started doing a small amount
of work with defense industry. I believe our
first industrial client was Raytheon in the early
to mid-1970s. Initially it was analysis in sup-
port of their air defense programs and then
grew to support their land warfare programs.
I believe we had more than 25 quick response
projects with them over the years. Generally,
our analyses examined the operational utility
of the systems that industry was developing
and assessed design capability tradeoffs to make
the systems more cost-effective. Through the
1970s and 1980s I expanded our industrial client
base to include Lockheed, IBM, Boeing, United
Defense, LTV, and a number of others who were
developing systems for the military services.
One of our largest studies for an industrial
client, and perhaps the most difficult one for
me, was done for the Georgia Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation (GELAC) in the 1984–1985 time pe-
riod. The purpose was to assist them in the de-
velopment of a new intratheater airlifter that
could be operationally effective in the Northern
Army Group region of NATO and in Southwest
Asia. It involved the addition of complete joint
service logistical operations to the VECTOR
series models to create VECTOR-3, the devel-
opment of scenarios and databases for both
regions, and extensive parametric analyses to
examine the operational effectiveness of alter-
native airlifters. We had the continuous partici-
pation and review by a board of senior Army
and Air Force generals chaired by Bill DePuy.
This is where I first met Bill Moore, former Com-
mander in Chief (CINC) of the Air Force Air
Mobility Command and Fritz Kroesen, the for-
mer CINC, US Army Europe (CINCUSAREUR)
whose sedan was fired on by the Baader-
Meinhof group in Germany. He looked like
a Hollywood type-cast Army general and was
deceptively very, very bright. The program was
substantially underbid and grossly mismanaged
by one of my VPs. The project was headed for
a gigantic loss (about a year’s earnings for
VRI), and possibly default. At Bill’s urgings,
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with six months remaining I relieved the VP,
and spent five to six months of 15–17 hour days,
six days a week managing and working on the
project team to complete it with about 50% of
the anticipated loss. I was so fatigued that a car-
diologist friend made me take a stress test and
go through a catheterization procedure. He as-
sured me nothing was wrong that a long beach
vacation wouldn’t cure. He was right.
Not long after that I directed what was
probably the first operational effectiveness
analysis of a potential stealth (low-observable)
fighter for the Lockheed’s Skunk Works. It
was interesting to learn that it could have a dra-
matic impact on an air campaign if employed
appropriately. It not only was itself more sur-
vivable, but its low-observability made it easier
for it to take out the threat’s air command and
control system, thus making all the nonstealthy
fighters in the fleet more survivable.
Bob Sheldon: Did you do any work with the
European OR community?
Seth Bonder: Yes. That’s a dimension of my
career that started with a 1974 NATO conference
in Munich organized by Reiner (Sam) Huber,
who then was the director of military analysis at
the IABG (Industrieanlagen-Betriebsgesellschaft)
of Messerschmitt Aircraft. Although I had never
met him, he invited me to present a paper and
chair a session on new combat models. (That
was the beginning of a lifelong friendship with
Sam and his family, with visits in Germany and
the US every couple of years.) I was also asked
by Ted Roderberg, the Director of OR at the
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE) Technical Centre (STC), to present
some talks to his staff before attending the
Munich meeting. At the Munich conference I
met a number of other European analysts includ-
ing David Dare, Jeff Hawkins, Hans Hoffman,
John Gibson and others from many different
countries whose names I have unfortunately
forgotten. In subsequent years I and my VRI
colleagues attended a number of other con-
ferences with this community, which led to
studies for some of them in the 1970s and
1980s. A number of the analytic groups through-
out Europe implemented various versions of
the Bonder-Farrell hybrid analytic-simulation
differential models of combat for analyses of
battalion-sized engagements.
The most significant project was performed
for STC during the period 1979–1982. The pur-
pose was to perform an Armor/Anti-armor ca-
pabilities analysis for each of the eight Corps
sectors in NATO’s Central Region using the
VECTOR-2 model, and in the process, transfer
the model to STC and train their analysts in
its use. The study required an enormous data
collection effort to obtain data for each of the
Corps and their opposing Warsaw Pact threats.
The training was accomplished by having the
STC analysts work hand-in-hand with the VRI
analysts, some of whom were stationed at STC
for extended periods. The study was completed
and Corps-by-Corps analysis results provided
to NATO’s senior leadership in early 1983. Based
on some of the initial work by Paul Haraschu at
STC, Bob Farrell built a methodology for con-
structing an aggregate ‘‘meta-model’’ to simulate
VECTOR model campaigns based on previous
campaign results. He applied and tested the
methodology using all the STC results to develop
the first version of the ‘‘MACRO’’ model which
could simulate central region campaigns orders
of magnitude faster than VECTOR-2. The meth-
odology and subsequent versions of MACRO
were extremely valuable in conducting analyses
after the Cold War ended.
Mike Garrambone: You’ve talked about your
work in the 1972–1989 time period, and I know
you were involved with other professional ac-
tivities besides MORS. Could you comment on
these?
Seth Bonder: Sure. In addition to periodi-
cally giving some talks at MORS meetings,
I was actively involved with the ASB, the Op-
erations Research Society of America (ORSA),
the International Federation of Operational Re-
search Societies (IFORS), and with advisory
activities to a number of universities. Let me
comment on each of these.
My association with the ASB started in
the early 1970s and was instigated by Wilbur
Payne. Wilbur and Dave Hardison wanted to
put an operations researcher on the Army Sci-
ence Board. (In those days it was called the
Army Science Advisory Panel – the ASAP).
The Army’s Chief Scientist, Marvin Lasser,
refused stating they just wanted technologists
on the Board. Wilbur and Dave threatened to
form an ORSAP, an OR Science Advisory Panel,
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with a member of one on it, me. Marv was wor-
ried about the competition so he agreed to
have an OR type on the Board. I believe I
was appointed in 1972–1973 and have been
on it for many years.
In the early 1970s there were only 25 full
members on the Board, mostly from hardware
industry firms. Given their particular corpora-
tion’s business, it was easy to identify potential
conflict of interest issues on ASB studies so
they could recuse themselves when appropri-
ate. Not long after I joined, Norm Augustine
(then the Army’s Assistant Secretary for Re-
search and Development [R&D]) told me he
had received a letter objecting to me (an OR
type) being on the Board because (as part of my
VRI business) I did studies across a spectrum
of Army problem areas and couldn’t be objec-
tive in performing a study for the ASB. Norm’s
response to the letter was typical Augustine:
‘‘If he were objective he wouldn’t know any-
thing.’’ I stayed on the Board.
Bob Sheldon: How long were you on the
ASB?
Seth Bonder: I was on the ASB until 1978 and
left after an argument over the Copperhead
system with Percy Pierre who was the new As-
sistant Secretary of the Army for Research, De-
velopment, and Acquisition (RDA). Percy was
a big advocate for Copperhead (which was a
laser-guided artillery round), but apparently
was having some problems selling it to Con-
gress. At one of the plenary meetings, he and
the four-star CG of the Army Materiel Command
(AMC) touted Copperhead’s virtues. Having re-
cently completed some studies on the system,
I pointed out that it would be effective if and
only if the Army made some significant doc-
trinal changes for its employment. Percy was fu-
rious. At break time he cornered me and said,
‘‘I’m reconstituting the ASB and if you want to
be on board the ship when it leaves the dock
I want your support for Copperhead.’’ I real-
ized he was trying to buy my advocacy so I
got upset and said something like, ‘‘What makes
you think I would want to be on your ASB?’’
Needless to say I wasn’t.
The story raises an important principle, at
least for me. I believe analysts should be objec-
tive in developing and providing information
to assist clients in making rational decisions.
The client may use that information to advocate
their position on an issue. I don’t believe the
analyst should become an advocate – you need
to maintain your reputation as an objective de-
veloper of the information. I have no problem
briefing study results if they support the client’s
position. And I have no problem with clients
not using my study results if they don’t support
their position. I do have problems when clients
want to ‘‘modify’’ some of the results as a basis
for advocacy–then my name comes off the study.
Ethics and principles are critical in maintaining
one’s professional reputation.
Bob Sheldon: That’s what General Kent says
too.
Seth Bonder: That doesn’t surprise me. He
understands the importance of honest and ob-
jective analysis.
I was off the ASB for four years, and in 1982
the new Assistant Secretary Jay Scully put me
back on the Board. I was on through 1992 when
I quit due to business commitments and sug-
gested that Peter Cherry become a member. I
was reappointed in 1998 when Peter’s tour was
up. My latest tour on the ASB expired in 2005.
As with MORS, I met some wonderful
bright individuals on the ASB (such as Russ
O’Neill, Norm Augustine, Larry Delaney, Jack
Vessey, Larry O’Neill, Gil Decker, Walt Laberge,
Dick Montgomery, Joe Braddock, George
Singley, and many others) who were dedicated
to helping the Army. Many of these individuals
have become lifelong friends. Although I worked
on a number of studies for the National Acad-
emy of Sciences and the National Research
Council, the ASB was the primary vehicle for
performing many of my pro bono study activities
during the 1972–1989 period. One of the early
studies was analysis of the Dragon antitank sys-
tem operational test data to help General DePuy
(then CG TRADOC) make a procurement buy
decision. Another helped General Miley (then
AMC Commander) determine how to fix the
SAM-D (now Patriot) air defense system and
its testing process when one of the first ones
failed and essentially fell off the test pad. In
1983, I chaired a panel for Secretary Scully to
review the development of the Army’s All
Source Analysis System which was experienc-
ing significant delays. With the help of some
bright ASB intelligence and IT members, we
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determined that applications software devel-
opment was the critical problem causing de-
lays. I recommended that an initial system with
lots of memory be procured from the black com-
munity, fielded to an operating division with a
cadre of programmers, and that the software
be developed jointly with the operating per-
sonnel. We estimated a full Division set could
be operational by 1987. The Under Secretary
complained that I was going around the estab-
lished acquisition process (which was correct),
and gave the program to one of the national
laboratories to complete. I don’t believe any-
thing was fielded until the late 1990s.
One of the nice benefits of being on the ASB,
at least years ago, was the occasional opportu-
nities to be with the operational troops in the
field. As an example, in the mid-1980s five of
us on an Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
(IEW) panel were invited by General Pat Criser,
CG of the 3rd ID, to observe EW operations as
part of the REFORGER (Return of Forces to
Germany) exercises in Germany. During the
exercise, we were helpful in getting EW activi-
ties more integrated with the operations side
of the division and I was able to observe the
‘‘fog of war’’ first hand. For a couple of days
Pat put us in a helicopter to observe operations
of various units during the exercise. At the com-
mand briefing one evening, one of the units
reported that it had successfully fought its way
across the Donau River, which I knew was not
true since I had just returned from that unit
a few minutes before. I expect today’s IT capa-
bilities might prevent errors of this type.
Perhaps the most memorable enjoyable
ASB study, and possibly the most useful one,
was the ad hoc ASB study I chaired in 1986 to
develop competitive strategies for defeating the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and
the Warsaw Pact. The ASB Chairperson wanted
me to have 10–15 ASB members on the study.
Fortunately, I was able to argue for a much
smaller team which included Larry Delaney
and Larry O’Neill –both broad thinkers with
strong technical capabilities. This study gave
rise to some new doctrinal thinking and started
a large number of black programs, many of
which have resulted in technologies used by
our operational forces in the field today. I think
this study is an example of the wise axiom that,
given a critical mass, productivity of a study
team is inversely proportional to the number
of team members.
Mike Garrambone: Any relation between
your ASB and ORSA activities?
Seth Bonder: No, not really. The ASB is a sci-
entific advisory body while ORSA is an OR
professional society, although it has been in-
volved with a few national issues such as scien-
tific assessment of the START-II Treaty. I was
ORSA’s representative and Norm Augustine
was the Aeronautical Society’s representative
to discussions with the State Department re-
garding the impacts of START-II. Since ORSA
was heavily governed by academics, there
was a little MORS overlap with folks like Jack
Borsting and Dave Schrady. ORSA is the venue
where Saul Gass and I became professional col-
leagues and good friends.
I joined ORSA as a student member in 1962.
I started attending the national meetings after
graduating from OSU in 1965 and became active
in the Military Applications Section (MAS) for
many years. I chaired the MAS in the late 1960s
or early 1970s, but don’t remember the exact
year. I ran numerous technical sessions, orga-
nized and chaired a national meeting, became
Secretary in 1974 and President in 1979. That
was a difficult time financially for the Society.
We only had about 20% of our annual expenses
(for the meetings, journals and the administra-
tive office) as a cash reserve. Any slip in revenues
from dues, journal subscriptions, or meeting
attendance would have been a disaster. Dave
Schrady was Treasurer at the time. With his
help and Council approval, I drastically cut
expenses, raised dues by almost 300 percent
(that made Council members very nervous),
and set a policy that no new initiatives could
be started until the cash reserve equaled the
annual expenses. I cut all journal pages in half,
which had all the editors screaming at me and
David. But the Society survived and grew over
the years with a sound financial basis.
For many years, The Institute of Manage-
ment Sciences (TIMS) and ORSA ran competi-
tive meetings and a lot of redundant activities
for essentially the same membership. During
my active time on the Council, we combined
the meetings and (with the help of Sid Hess)
I created the concept of a Joint Council of the
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two organizations to minimize the redundant
activities between them. This trend culminated
with the merger of ORSA and TIMS in the
mid-1990s into the Institute for Operations Re-
search and Management Sciences (INFORMS).
As I did through my activities with the Uni-
versity of Michigan, VRI, the ASB, and MORS,
I developed professional associations, and in
some cases lifetime friendships, with yet an-
other group of professionals. Some of these
include Al Blumstein (Carnegie Mellon), Saul
Gass (University of Maryland), Jack Borsting,
Dave Schrady, Bill Pierskalla (UCLA), Mike
Thomas (Georgia Tech), Tom Magnanti (MIT),
George Nemhauser (Georgia Tech), Art Geoffrion
(UCLA), Dick Larson (MIT) and many other
bright academics and researchers. (Some even
knew how to have fun—you should ask Saul
Gass about the late evening parties after long
Council meetings and dinner.) I have very fond
memories of actively working with all of them
for many years to establish and grow the OR
profession. I was able to expand these pro-
fessional activities on an international scale by
presenting plenary papers at the tri-annual
meetings of IFORS – an organization with over
130 nation members –and even more so when
I was elected as a Vice President of the Federa-
tion in 1985.
During this period I was also involved with
ORSA’s founding of the ‘‘Visiting Lectureship
Program’’ and was one of its early lecturers.
The objective of the program was to expand
the academic side of OR by having senior
professionals visit with departments who had
expressed an interest in starting an academic
OR program in their university. The lecturers
would present applied or theoretical research
seminars to interested faculty and students,
participate in a question and answer (Q&A)
session about the OR profession, meet with po-
tential faculty regarding possible curriculum
designs, and other activities to promote the
development of OR programs and attract stu-
dents to the OR profession. Because of my aca-
demic activities via ORSA and the University
of Michigan, and my applied OR, engineering
and business experience through VRI, I have
served on a number of advisory committees
for engineering and business schools through-
out the country, including the University of
Southern California (USC), Virginia Tech,
OSU, University of Miami, and others.
A couple of points before turning to the
1989–2000 period of this history which was
exciting for me professionally and challenging
for me personally. I noted earlier that the Army
had performed extensive experimentation in
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s to develop funda-
mental knowledge about combat processes at
the tactical level which we used as a basis for
developing many of the combat models. Much
of this experimentation was conducted at the
Army’s Combat Developments Experimenta-
tion Command (CDEC). In 1981 there appeared
to be a shift to more operational testing of sys-
tems at CDEC and less real experimentation.
This trend continued until the early 1990s when
I believe CDEC was closed.
Bob Sheldon: What was the rationale for that
decision?
Seth Bonder: I really don’t know. TRADOC
had some good senior leadership at that time
who understood the value of analysis and
experimentation, including Generals DePuy,
Starry, Otis, Thurman, and Foss. The best per-
son to ask would be Marion Bryson who ran
CDEC for many years. Perhaps there was no
longer a need for it then. I believe there clearly
is a need today given the major changes in op-
erational processes and technologies associated
with net-centric warfare, systems-of-systems,
counterinsurgency operations, stability opera-
tions and other new activities for our operating
forces. I don’t think we have an empirically
based understanding of these processes for
their effective implementation or experimen-
tal data as a basis for building models to help
us develop this understanding.
As noted earlier, I did not have any growth
plans when I started VRI, effectively in 1971.
I was primarily interested in establishing a qual-
ity reputation for the company. I enjoyed doing
technical work and didn’t want to be just a cor-
porate manager. Although we had grown ev-
ery year until the mid-1980s, after a couple of
minimal growth years, Bob convinced me we
needed to develop plans for more aggressive
growth. This would provide needed career-
growth paths for long-term employees and al-
low us to bid on larger programs in the DoD.
I decided we would try to achieve this growth
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internally (i.e., not by acquisition) by expanding
our military and health analysis lines of busi-
ness and by leveraging these to make an entre´e
into the IT business. Much of this happened in
the 1989–2000 period of my career. This is prob-
ably a good time to segue into this period of
dramatic changes in my professional and per-
sonal life.
Bob Sheldon: What made it so different from
the 1972–1989 period?
Seth Bonder: So many things changed. There
was a major change in the global security envi-
ronment which led to changes in how I did stud-
ies, the types of decisions addressed, and the
decision makers I worked for. In addition to the
tactical and operational-level issues addressed
in the previous two decades, in the 1990s my
analysis activities expanded to include strategic
and policy level issues for senior leadership of
the Army, JCS, and CINCs of Unified Com-
mands (now referred to as Combatant Com-
mands). It also was the first time I became
deeply involved in VRI’s health analysis busi-
ness. I had a major life style change toward
the end of this period, but let me take a moment
to remind you what the security environment
looked like before this period of time as back-
ground for these changes.
Bob Sheldon: Are you referring to the Cold
War?
Seth Bonder: Exactly. Throughout most of
the Cold War, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact had
a significant conventional force advantage over
the NATO alliance—approximately two-to-one
strategic advantage in armored systems and a
much greater operational and tactical advan-
tage if they chose to mass in a specific area for
an attack against NATO. NATO relied on nu-
clear means to deter a massive Soviet offensive
in Europe. Strange as it may sound, this was
a relatively stable global security environment.
The US and the Soviet Union were military su-
perpowers who maintained strong influence
over policies and activities within their alli-
ances. The Soviets simultaneously maintained
significant control over many Third World coun-
try military activities through economic means,
technology controls, and military pressure. Al-
though regional conflicts occurred during this
period, with hindsight from 2006, it really was
a relatively stable security environment.
Although many analysts may not remem-
ber this, there was also stability for defense
planning and associated OR analyses during
this time frame. And there was very little uncer-
tainty in our defense planning activities. The
focus was Europe—the US and NATO were
committed to stop a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact
attack. The threat was clear. We knew the size
and location of Soviet and Pact forces. We knew
their attack options, how they would fight, their
equipment, their command and control pro-
cesses, and many other characteristics. Based
on years of analyses, we understood the war-
fighting dynamics of a potential conflict, and
we recognized that feasible conventional changes
in various components of warfighting capabil-
ity (e.g., new systems, force designs, and force
size) could not alter the conventional force
imbalance. Changes that were made I believe
were intended to raise the nuclear threshold.
I apologize for the political-military history
lesson but it provides the backdrop for why I
made so many changes in VRI’s analysis busi-
ness starting in 1989–1990.
Bob Sheldon: What motivated the changes
at that time?
Seth Bonder: Eventually it was the end of
the Cold War, but I started making changes
before then due to a couple of conversations I
had with General Max Thurman in 1987. I met
Max many years before when he worked for
General DePuy, and did some personnel-related
studies for him in the early 1980s when he was
the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
(DCSPER). He was still the Vice Chief of Staff
in 1987. We would occasionally get together to
discuss some of the studies I was doing for
TRADOC and other Army agencies.
During one of these meetings he casually
said, ‘‘Soviet communism will collapse soon
and the Soviet Union will be dissolved,’’ which
also implied that the Warsaw Pact would break
up. I thought he was smoking something or just
losing it. He said, ‘‘The Wall will come down in
a couple of years.’’ Max obviously had knowl-
edge that I didn’t have. My guess is that he
had been privy to conversations taking place be-
tween the Reagan administration and the Soviet
Union led by Mr. Gorbachev. Not long after that,
Max became the TRADOC Commander. At a
subsequent meeting in his office at TRADOC
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Headquarters, we discussed the ramifications
of his conjecture. It seemed clear that without
the influence of both superpowers, the world
would become much more unstable. He sug-
gested that there would be major changes in
the military forces of the US and NATO nations,
and that I should ‘‘set up a hot plant to conduct
extensive analyses over the next five to ten
years.’’ Sure enough, the Conventional Forces
in Europe (CFE) talks and negotiations started
in 1989, which eventually led to the treaty. The
events in 1989–1995 proved how omniscient
Max was.
Bob Sheldon: Were you involved in the CFE
activities?
Seth Bonder: I was not in the line activity
of structuring the negotiation packages, but I
started doing CFE related studies in late 1989
in support of it. In 1989, General Thurman left
TRADOC to become Commander of US South-
ern Command (SOUTHCOM) where he led
the Panama invasion (‘‘Operation Just Cause’’)
and captured Mr. Noriega in 1990. General John
Foss replaced Max as the TRADOC Com-
mander and asked me to do a risk analysis of
the potential CFE treaty. I was pleased that
General Glenn Otis, who had just retired as
the CINCUSAREUR, joined VRI as an Associate
and agreed to work on the CFE study with me.
The intent of the CFE talks was to asymmet-
rically reduce forces in both the Warsaw Pact
and NATO (accordingly, oftentimes referred to
as the Asymmetric Force Reductions talks) to
a position of parity of both forces. This was a
gigantic step for the Soviet Union. I may be
slightly off from the exact numbers, but the
Warsaw Pact had something like 56,000 tanks
and NATO had 20,000 tanks –reductions would
bring both alliances to the same level some-
where below 20,000! There were to be similar
reductions in artillery, aircraft, and other weapon
systems. The eventual treaty involved a large
number of details regarding which nations
would take which reductions, verification of
reductions, etc.
Bob Sheldon: Why would the Soviets agree
to such a large disparity in reductions?
Seth Bonder: I don’t know, and I would be
surprised if many people knew at the time. The
logic provided to the public was that the Soviets
could not afford to keep up with President
Reagan’s large expenditures to modernize
the US military forces (his ‘‘offset strategy’’).
I’m sure there must be a number of books written
on that topic since then. Anyway, this quick-
response study was completed in late 1989 or
early 1990. It concluded that there was no ‘‘oper-
ational minimum,’’ and that there could be sig-
nificant risks with the treaty. Let me briefly
comment on each of these.
Although there was agreement that there
should be parity of forces, it wasn’t clear what
that level should be. Studies by RAND sug-
gested that there was a floor that the reductions
should not go below. The VRI study indicated
that there was no such floor—it would not be
detrimental, from a warfighting perspective, to
go further down the parity line than the level be-
ing discussed by the negotiators. After lots of
discussions and comparing analyses, the RAND
analysts sort of agreed that there might not be
an operational minimum.
Based on the VRI analysis, I concluded that
there could be significant warfighting risks
when the forces reduced to the agreed-upon
parity levels because the basic warfighting phys-
ics appeared to change when the major force
imbalance was removed. In contrast to the Cold
War period when feasible changes in warfight-
ing components (such as new systems, addi-
tional forces, and reinforcement capability) could
not alter the warfighting imbalance, this study
suggested that relatively minor advantages or
small changes in many of these dimensions by
either side could significantly affect warfight-
ing capability when the alliances were at those
suggested parity force levels. Modernization had
an especially large impact on warfighting capa-
bility. Accordingly, I thought that slight modern-
ization improvements by the Soviets, additional
unilateral reductions by some NATO nations,
slight delays in expected warning times, and
other small changes in any of these dimensions
after the treaty was implemented posed significant
warfighting risks for the NATO alliance.
When the study was completed, John Foss
asked me to brief the results to General Jack
Galvin who was the SACEUR (the military com-
mander for all of NATO, and also the Commander
of the US European Command –EUCOM). Al-
though I briefed him at SHAPE (Supreme Head-
quarters Allied Powers Europe) Headquarters
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in Mons, Belgium, I only briefed his US com-
manders because the study was classified Se-
cret, No Foreign.
General Galvin’s SHAPE HQ was in Mons
and his EUCOM HQ was in Stuttgart, Germany.
NATO HQ is in Brussels. At the end of my brief-
ing in the morning, Jack thought the results
were so important that I should brief it to all
the NATO commanders in the afternoon. (I
may have this number wrong, but believe he
had 60 four-star generals reporting to him.) I
reminded him that the study was classified No
Foreign. He got on the phone, quickly removed
that impediment, and I briefed the NATO com-
manders that afternoon. Although he liked the
study, General Galvin was upset and wanted
to know why a study about his theater of oper-
ations was being done by someone else. Before I
could attempt an answer, he said: ‘‘If you do
studies about my theater, I want you to do them
for me.’’ And we did a few studies for him over
the next three years. One of them examined the
impacts of nonlinear operational concepts and
deep-strike precision munitions on warfighting
capability after CFE. Another was to help him
design NATO’s Rapid Reaction Force in 1991
which I will comment on a little later in this
interview.
As you know, the CFE treaty led to the
breakup of the Warsaw Pact alliance, reunifica-
tion of Germany, collapse of Soviet commu-
nism, and dissolution of the Soviet Union in
the early 1990s. This further reduced the mas-
sive threat to NATO and led to unilateral reduc-
tions by our NATO allies and major cuts in US
defense budgets to achieve the ‘‘peace divi-
dend,’’ which of course led to major reduc-
tions in our military forces.
Before coming to TRADOC, General Foss
was the CG of the 18th Airborne Corps whose
forces would fight in Southwest Asia (SWA—
Iraq, Iran, etc.) if a conflict required US forces
in that region. Apparently, John was already
concerned about the region’s instability because
in late July 1990 he asked me to assess US war
fighting capability in the region using one of
TRADOC’s Southwest Asia scenarios (called
SWASIA). In early August, Saddam Hussein
invaded Kuwait—John must have had a crystal
ball! Operation Desert Shield started thereaf-
ter and the buildup to Operation Desert Storm
began. The air war started in January 1991,
and the ground war about a month later. We
completed our study by February 1991, in-
cluding assessment of the scenario’s version
of the left-hook strategy.
Bob Sheldon: Sounds like General Thurman
had it right.
Seth Bonder: Absolutely. He was right about
the Soviet threat to NATO going away; about
the world becoming more unstable with Desert
Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, some others, and the
current Iraq conflict as evidence; and the need
for major changes in the military forces of the
US and NATO. He was also right about VRI per-
forming extensive analyses to assist military
leadership with some of these changes. I’ve al-
ready mentioned the CFE and Desert Storm
ones and will get to others shortly after I com-
ment on what the global security environment
now looked like after collapse of the Soviet
Union and Desert Storm.
Desert Storm gave us a view into future po-
tential conflicts: They would be ad hoc coali-
tion conflicts, contingency operations requiring
power projection, and opponents could have
modern technologies for use on the battlefield
because they were becoming available to all
nations. In a few short years, the Cold War’s
two-superpower era transformed into a new
multipolar world that was more disorderly, more
unstable, and more uncertain, with increased
likelihood of multiple Third World conflicts.
And the uncertainty was large. We no longer
were going to Europe to fight the Warsaw Pact.
We didn’t know what type of contingency
operations we were going to be committed to
(later referred to as major theater of war [MTW],
small scale contingency [SSC], stability and
support operations [SASO]); we didn’t know
where geographically we might have to oper-
ate; didn’t know who our coalition partners
might be; and we didn’t know who the threat
might be, how he would be equipped, and how
he would fight.
The US was the sole remaining superpower
in this environment. We created a new National
Military Strategy which emphasized regional
conflicts and crisis response. The National Mil-
itary Strategy success criterion was to apply
‘‘decisive’’ force to win swiftly and minimize
casualties. The strategy was to draw down
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overseas forces and rely on power projection
for contingency operations. As Max had forecast,
US military capability had to be restructured
to achieve the peace dividend by considering
changes in force structure and design, modern-
ization, forward stationing, strategic lift, mobi-
lization, active-reserve force mix, and other
dimensions of our military capability.
I believe VRI and other OR analysis orga-
nizations such as Center for Army Analysis
(CAA) formerly Concepts Analysis Agency, and
TRAC, played a significant role in this restruc-
turing of the Army and the other military services.
I think it would be appropriate at this point
to discuss the 1989–2000 period of my career.
But first, I have to go back a bit to 1987 and set
the stage by explaining my role with Vector
Analysis.
I ran a lot of the projects. I would direct
three or four at a time, and people would be
implementing and creating results, but I always
wanted to be involved no matter how big the
company got because I liked doing analysis.
So I would direct two or three, and I may even
have done one with two or three people; I had
some superb people like Mike Farrell (as distin-
guished from Bob Farrell, whom I mentioned
earlier) and George Miller who could imple-
ment. We would brainstorm together; then they
would go run some models and prepare some
results. When I say ‘‘I,’’ I really mean I and my
teams at Vector. But, for lots of different reasons,
during the period of 1989–2000, we grew be-
yond the operational level of analysis to what
I think is strategic policy-level analysis. We cre-
ated a new OR analysis paradigm that had not
existed prior to 1989.
VRI expanded significantly in size. And
I had a lifestyle change at the same time. There
was a new military strategy that came out at that
time. I think the buzzwords were Win Deci-
sively; that is, you have a decisive force to
win swiftly and minimize casualties. That was
the new criterion. During the Cold War, we did
studies and, if we lost 100,000 people, this was
expected. Then, in Desert Storm, we lost around
100. This led to the opinion that from now on
or in any war, we cannot lose more than 100.
But now and at the end of the Cold War, the
entire US military force had to be restructured
because we needed a 30–35% cut in forces in
order to achieve that peace dividend. We knew
there were going to be changes in force struc-
ture and force design, there were going to be
big changes in modernization, there were going
to be big changes in strategic lift and strategic
mobility because we went from prepositioned
forces in Europe to a force in CONUS (Conti-
nental United States) that we had to take wher-
ever we wished to go fight. The whole concept
of how we were going to fight wars changed in
a period of three or four years. That led to lots
of changes in how we did analysis. VRI and
many other organizations played a big role in
this restructuring of the Army, and I assume
the Air Force and the Navy, although most of
my work was for the Army. It was done in joint
analysis, but I was not restructuring the Air
Force. I was restructuring the Army.
Analysis became very difficult to perform
for a number of reasons. First of all, budgets
got tight. Not only the budget for analysis, but
the budget for the things you wished to buy.
We had to think about power projection. We
never thought about that before; the analysis
was all done, we’re in Europe, and we’re start-
ing a war. Now the issue was that we had to
mobilize back in the US, then we had to embark
to go some place, then we had to debark, and
then go fight a war. We were then faced with
the mobilization problem, the deployment prob-
lem, and then the theater employment problem.
We had to worry about them simultaneously,
because they traded off between each other.
Let me give you an example. You can have a
force you deploy very fast because it is light,
but when it gets there, it cannot do anything.
On the other hand, you can take a long time
getting a force there, and when it gets there, it
will be useful. How to make those trades and
also trades back into the mobilization process
of railroads and materiel getting to our ports,
what ports do they go to, what airfields do they
go to, what do you fly over first, what do you
send by ship—all of those topics became anal-
ysis issues from 1989 to 1996, and I think re-
main even now.
So, we had the power projection problem,
and we had a new National Military Strategy.
You had to have decisive force, so you could
win swiftly and lose almost nobody. The deci-
sion making process in the Pentagon became
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very volatile. I do not mean they were scream-
ing at each other, but things changed rapidly.
The Services filling the various roles were
changing. Who was doing deep strike? Was
it Army or the Air Force? We weren’t quite sure.
Funding changed. You may have had funding
for a study, which had funding for the systems
you’re looking at, and the next morning that
would change. The assumptions on funding
would change; the administrative policies of
how you did studies would change.
The things I refer to as uncontrollable, I sum
all up in what I call operations situations, in-
cluding who the threat is, where the threat is,
what does the environment look like, what does
the threat have, how are they going to fight, all
the things you cannot control in an analysis.
During the Cold War, we knew all of those.
Post-Cold War, you knew none of it. It came
down to: you can’t just pick a spot to fight and
therefore, have these systems. I had to worry
about where in the world I was going, who I
was going to fight, and who my coalition part-
ners were in order to arrive at some reasonable
alternative systems or force structures or force
designs or strategic lift or all the other issues.
Analysis thus became very different. I know
a number of studies during the Cold War that
took two years to do, would involve 20 to 30
analysts, and, after two years, nothing much
came of it because you just kept doing the same
studies over and over because you knew what
was in Europe. Now the paradigm for analysis
changed, and I made a big change at Vector. I
presented some papers on it, and I think other
people did similarly. We moved to what was
then called ‘‘quick reaction analysis.’’ I think
the longest one we ever did was five months.
On average, they were two or three months.
Some of them were two weeks. Some of them
were days.
Mike Garrambone: What was the pressure for
those older analysis types? They used to take
much longer.
Seth Bonder: There was no pressure for
those.
Mike Garrambone: Now all of a sudden you
have one-third the time or less for the ‘‘quick
reaction’’ types?
Seth Bonder: Much less, because they
needed answers. They were making decisions
on restructuring on all of the types of problems
I mentioned earlier: the force structure, force
design, new modernization, and strategic lift.
They wanted answers for all of these strategic
policy-level issues tomorrow. Let me give you
an example. In fact, it led to the concept that I
call continuous analysis.
Analysis used to be an event. Somebody
had a problem, they came to you, you did your
analysis and you gave them the answer and you
went away. I convinced General Carl Vuono
when he was Chief of Staff of the Army, by say-
ing, ‘‘Look, we have a million issues to look at.
Why don’t we just start doing analysis continu-
ously, and when you have questions, we’ll try to
address them.’’ It had a high value because if
you did continuous analysis, when our intui-
tion got better, we would work on problems
we thought were important to them. We dis-
cussed with them which were important, and
we could respond quickly with analysis we
had already done to issues that got raised later.
Let me give you the prime example. We were
doing studies on roles and missions for the
Army.
Mike Garrambone: That’s a volatile issue.
Seth Bonder: Oh, it was very volatile.
Mike Garrambone: I think that has been
kicking around since 1947.
Seth Bonder: Yes, but after the demise of the
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact it raised its
head again because we started to get into deep
strike systems, who’s really going to do deep
strike, and who’s in charge of what.
The point I’m making is the concept of con-
tinuous analysis gets you smarter and makes
you more responsive to the decision makers,
and I thought that was very useful. We did a
lot of that.
Quick response analysis was done by four
or five analysts—not 20, and may have in-
cluded the computer programmer who made
changes for us in the models. We created some
new metrics and used some old ones. We used
to call it the warfighting-casualty curve. On the
x-axis was the FER, the Force Exchange Ratio,
and on the y-axis were casualties. It was by
theater. We would run hundreds and hundreds
of simulation runs and plot these curves to try
to get a handle on what the word decisive
meant. We used the FER against casualties.
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Dr. Bob Helmbold at CAA used another vari-
able, and he said ours was wrong. Our variables
were inverted, so his curves looked different
from our curves. But once we got on the same
wavelength, the curves looked very similar.
Winning was defined in a certain way in
the historical data. We used what Bob did, and
did our own analysis with it, and created what
people used to call the horseshoe curve or the
heel. It allowed us to take a look at how to define
‘‘decisive’’ to meet the National Military Strat-
egy. I’ll get to that more in a little bit. We created
something called the window of risk. Because
we were a deployment force now, we were in-
terested in how fast you had to get there, and
the window of risk. It was defined as the period
of time from C-Day (the day a deployment op-
eration begins) until you arrive. You had to get
there within that window or you could not win;
the threat would win. Take over the ports or
whatever you needed. The US couldn’t get there
fast enough to do the job.
We also changed the concept of analysis. We
used to make maybe 15 simulation runs dur-
ing the Cold War, that is, 15 runs for every
case; so we’d make thousands of runs because
we had extensive sensitivity analysis. Well,
suppose you didn’t have this system but had
a different system. Suppose this force was a little
bigger than we assumed it was, there were so
many uncertainties, we had to do sensitivity
analysis around all the uncertainties.
Bob Sheldon: How did you account for false
alarm rate, i.e., mobilize when you really shouldn’t
have?
Seth Bonder: We couldn’t care less (Laughs).
That is, if we mobilize and are ready to go
somewhere – to start early. We did some studies
for General Galvin on a Rapid Reaction Force,
where in fact, we said, you have to start before
C-Day (Laughs). You have to have started back
then if you’re going to be able to do anything
useful tomorrow.
Mike Garrambone: Who made that call?
Seth Bonder: The military did. A lot of our
briefings said the following: ‘‘If you believe,
A, B, C and D, then, do this.’’ If a US decision
maker doesn’t think that’s a good assumption,
we have to go back to the drawing board. Be-
cause this depended on so many underlying
uncertainties, we tried to look at and see the
impact of assumptions and point out the big
ones. In our Rapid Reaction Force Study in
1992, we recommended that for him to go to
a certain place, he had to start way earlier than
he thought and get his boats moving (Laughs)
to where they needed to be. If they got there
and nothing happened, then fine, turn around
and come home. That’s okay. Because the down-
side risk of delaying was the real disaster.
In Operation Desert Storm, if Saddam had
had half-a-brain (Laughs) he’d have kept right
on coming down over the ports. We couldn’t
stop him; we couldn’t get there soon enough.
He waited until we built up this gigantic force
and then decided to come. I have no idea why,
but our analysis suggested he could have done
better; too bad for him he didn’t have a good
analysis team.
Let’s continue with this new paradigm. We
had all these extensive sensitivity analyses to
do, and in a previous phase of this discussion
we’re having, I talked about all the VECTOR
Series, campaign models that we used. But
you couldn’t make 3,000 sensitivity runs of
VECTOR 3 or 2, so we learned to build ana-
lytical models that simulated the VECTOR
models. We called these macro models. We’d
run the VECTOR Series, do some fitting, run
the macro some more, come back and test it out
in VECTOR. So, as part of the new paradigm,
we had models that simulated the models.
Bob Sheldon: Were those macros statistical
regressions?
Seth Bonder: Yes, they were regressions. We
got a lot of data, not only out of the VECTOR
Series here, but out of SHAPE Technical Centre;
we did studies for them. They did a bunch of
Armor/Anti-armor studies when they brought
our VECTOR 2 model on board in Europe. We
used a lot of that data to create a macro, to do
a lot of their studies, especially the sensitivity
analyses. We also changed some of the admin-
istrative aspects. We had all of these results,
and the question was, ‘‘How do you present
them?’’ During the Cold War, briefings went
as follows: ‘‘Good afternoon. Here’s the ques-
tion we addressed. Let me tell you how we
addressed it.’’ We spent 45 minutes describing
all of the models and all of the assumptions,
everything and then, in the last 15 minutes, if
there was any time left, we’d explain the results.
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Now, we turned that whole paradigm back-
wards. When we talked to the senior guys, the
decision makers, which were the four-stars or
the Secretaries, we would go in and say, ‘‘Here’s
the issue, here’s what we did—not how, and
here’s the results.’’
Now the question is, ‘‘How do you present
those results when you have thousands of data
points?’’ We figured out how to use color to
represent content, not aesthetics, not to look
pretty, but the color represented content. Orig-
inally, we used stop light charts, which related
to some criteria, but we got even better than
that. Learning how to use color, so when the
decision maker looked at it, he could get a good
feel for the results, even though he was looking
at maybe a thousand campaign results. In a color
graph—one graph, two graphs, and he could get
a feel for where the power was and where his
weaknesses were, for the decision he was to
make. Now, how we did this. We would nor-
mally meet with his staff earlier, discuss the
how, and go through that wicket with them be-
fore we got to the boss. Although for many
of our senior decision maker studies, and I’m
talking three-star, four-star, Secretariat, it was
clear to me that we could not do a study for
them unless they were involved; I mean really
involved.
When, for example, General Galvin said,
‘‘I want you to do a study on the Rapid Reaction
Force,’’ I said, ‘‘You have to be part of it.’’ He
said, ‘‘What do I have to do?’’ I said, ‘‘Just meet
at the beginning with me, so we can make sure
we have the right question. Meet about half-
way through, for an hour, and I’ll show you
what we’re doing and if it makes sense to you;
and then I’ll give you a sense of what kind of re-
sults you might expect to see. If you think it’s
nonsense, we learn right there, and then on the
back end, I want to spend time really debriefing
you on what we did.’’ Some of the clients actually
got involved in the studies. It was so important
that you didn’t address the wrong question. We
always made sure we had the right question be-
cause at the very first meeting, I’d say, ‘‘Let me
pose to you the type of output results we may
get for you. Will that satisfy you?’’ And he’d
say, ‘‘I don’t want that.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, that’s the
question we thought we heard you ask’’ and
he’d say, ‘‘Well, let me rephrase the question.’’
That was very useful and to the extent you
can do that on studies – even if you’re doing it
for lower level staff, you then have an advocate
for the study. Of course, they’re part of the
study. We, Vector, got involved and I ran quite
a few of the studies, not all of them, but quite
a few of them. If I didn’t direct them, I knew
what was going on in them because nothing left
Vector for high level review that I was not in-
volved in.
For force levels to meet the National Mili-
tary Strategy, we started to really look at how
much is enough. That was never touched years
ago, because we never could get enough infor-
mation (Laughs). When we did the Army Roles
and Missions studies, we did stationing strate-
gies—where should we place forces, if we
placed any; we did the tradeoff study between
mobilization, deployment and employment. In
those days, we worried about Southwest Asia
and Korea. We created the concept for zero-
based force design. Everybody kept saying,
you can’t have the same forces you had during
the Cold War. So we said, ‘‘Okay, we’ll design
a force from the bottom up.’’ We created a meth-
odology for doing that, starting with a totally
clean slate. We knew we would have to have
a command and control function. We knew we
would have to have an intelligence function,
and some sort of fundamentals. After that, we
built it all up; all the warfighting parts, the logis-
tic parts, intelligence parts – built up, from the
zero-base. I think that study may have been
done for Mike Stone, the Secretary of the Army.
We did a really interesting study on force
structure versus modernization for Carl Vuono.
The issue he had for the overall Army was to
come down from 680,000; the question was
what level to come down to? And how much
money do I put into modernization? On a pre-
vious study, I’d convinced him that moderni-
zation is an important player. The catchphrase
I created was, ‘‘The smaller the force, the more
modern it has to be.’’ And that’s a true state-
ment. It has more of an impact. So we did the
study in which we started at 680,000 and re-
duced the end strength at each introduction
changing the whole force design, reducing the
end strength. As we did that, we saved money
and put more money into modernization, and
we created one curve that had for the x-axis
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end strength versus the modernization, how
much modernization and how much end
strength. We had different budget levels. We
showed effectiveness-investment curves, as a
function of all those data points. Each data
point created a force, which we then fought a
war with, and did this again and again for all dif-
ferent combinations and created effectiveness-
investment curves. But, we overlaid budgets on
top of that. If you look at the curves, you’d see
what’s called an efficient point. It’s where the
highest effectiveness just touches the budget
level that you can get. Clearly, the more budget,
the better you can do; you can get more out
there. We learned a lot of things such as if you
move off that efficient point, you need a lot of
modernization to account for the small falloff
in end strength. And, we learned a lot about
the dynamics of trading modernization for end
strength.
That one curve was the big study result; it
took us four months to get it. I called General
Vuono and I said, ‘‘I’ll be coming into town.
Can you spare time to look at this?’’ He said,
‘‘How much do you want?’’ I said, ‘‘At least
an hour.’’ He said, ‘‘Come on into town and then
come fly with me.’’ So I flew with him, out to
the west coast. We had lots of time, and we sat
down and went through the curves. It was very
complicated to look at, until you got an explana-
tion. Anyway, we recommended 508,000 at the
time and that’s what they eventually decided,
but then they dropped to 480,000. Wonderful
studies are the things that I love to do because
we were really helping people, we were applied,
and learning a lot about tradeoffs in planning
for forces, and then tradeoffs in operations. We
did our analysis in both Southwest Asia and
Korea; we didn’t do much in Europe anymore,
and all of our analysis tended to be joint and co-
alition campaigns. So we had the Air Force, the
Navy offshore with deep strike, and coalition
partners.
We did studies for a lot of senior leadership.
I already mentioned some: the study of con-
ventional forces in Europe was for General John
Foss, who was head of TRADOC; we did stud-
ies for JCS, the CINCs and the Chiefs of Staff
and the Secretaries. We did force structure ver-
sus modernization for General Vuono. We did
the Air Force CAS (Close Air Support) to the
Army for General Sullivan; that was a four-
day study—it was short and easy. We did a
study for General RisCassi, who was in charge
in Korea; I’m guessing the time period was
September 1992 or 1993. General RisCassi told
me, ‘‘I want you to do a study so that I can pres-
ent a paper, along with General Colin Powell,
Chairman, JCS, telling the ROK (Republic of
Korea) Army how they should modernize for
the next ten years.’’
I said, ‘‘Okay, this is September, when do
you want it?’’ He said, ‘‘Well, the ministerials are
in November.’’ (Laughs) I said, ‘‘It’s September.’’
He said, ‘‘I know; we need a six-week study.’’
I said, ‘‘You know, you’re over there and we’re
over here.’’ Well we had all these classified
lines for phone talk; I made two trips over there
in between, meeting with him. He came back
on one trip and we went over and presented
the study to him and gave him all the charts
he then took to the ministerials.
Bob Sheldon: What assumptions did you
make on US force presence?
Seth Bonder: We then had 37,000 – whatever
forces we had at the time, but now we brought
more in. Not on D-Day, not in the beginning.
We showed how ROK modernization could re-
duce their dependence on the US; that was the
intent. The US would basically pay for a lot of
the modernization and give them our systems.
It was interesting because there is also an anal-
ysis shop in Korea. They redid the study and
came up with the same answers.
Bob Sheldon: Korean Institute for Defense
Analyses (KIDA)?
Seth Bonder: Yes, something like that. I guess
RisCassi said they should do a parallel study,
and they came up with very similar results –
not exactly the same, obviously. We did a study
for General Galvin, which I will expound on
a little bit because it was an important study;
it led to another sort of criterion. I think it was
1992, maybe 1993, when he said, ‘‘Look, the So-
viet Union’s gone; we have a new NATO now.
I want to have a force that I can use for crises
response.’’ He called it the Rapid Reaction
Force; it eventually became the Rapid Reaction
Corps. He said, ‘‘I want a force that is politically
feasible.’’
Each of the nations had to play. The US had
to commit some combat forces, because if we
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didn’t have combat forces, we wouldn’t suffer
casualties, and the other nations wanted us to
suffer with them. There were a lot of political
constraints like this on this force. So General
Galvin said, ‘‘Politically feasible and capable
of crisis response and capable of holding in
some areas until the bigger force can get there.’’
The first part was a political analysis, in which
we were trying to find out what the constraints
were that would limit what the force could look
like. He put one other constraint on us, which
was critical. He said (I may be exaggerating)
‘‘I don’t want this fully adapt stuff anymore;
we’re done with that.’’ He said, ‘‘I want you to
think about wars anywhere that NATO will
have to go.’’ I said, ‘‘It’s a lot of places, right?’’
We created the concept of a parametric threat,
parametric scenarios. In fact, what we created
was 27 different scenarios that were used. We
did the analysis and built the force from the
ground up; we did a zero-base build. We started
with zero and built up the force, to get a Rapid
Reaction Force that was limited by the con-
straints. Eventually we would add a package,
run it through the political constraints—and it
was okayed. We would run it through a warfight
to see if it enhanced warfighting. There were
lots of alternative packages, so we ran differ-
ent kinds of alternative packages through and
added the one that was a heuristic that gave
the highest return on the margins. This was not
conventional; there are better algorithms, but
we were using a heuristic.
Once we got a force that was good for this
scenario, we switched in a new scenario, and
we’d build again. We built 27 different forces,
and then looked for the commonality across
them, to see if we could arrive at a force that
was politically feasible, and did okay in the
27 scenarios. The force we eventually arrived
at was green (OK) in about 19 of them, yellow
(iffy) in about 2, and it was red (meaning it
was bad) in a few others. We figured out ways
to supplement that quickly with tactical air
wings. We had some air force assets standing
by for that part of the force, but we added sep-
arate tactical air wings that could come from
Italy or Germany or elsewhere.
Jim McCarthy, an Air Force four-star, was
Galvin’s deputy at the time. Every time I’d do
a study for General Galvin, McCarthy would
say to me, ‘‘You don’t have it right. You don’t
have enough air power.’’ And I’d say, ‘‘Well,
that’s the air power we have; that’s the data,’’
and he said, ‘‘Well, go to Air Force Studies and
Analysis.’’ I’d go to Studies and Analysis and
they said, ‘‘We don’t have data on that.’’ (Laughs).
‘‘Where does McCarthy think we have that
data?’’ Not only sorties, but attrition on each
sortie, because we were representing flights
of aircraft in the models.
By just trying to come up with a way to
make the Rapid Reaction Force cover all of the
27 scenarios, this highlighted the whole con-
cept for a need of battlefield versatility. I sug-
gested adding two or maybe four tactical air
wings when I briefed General Galvin. I had
Mike Farrell with me (Mike, mentioned earlier,
was a VRI employee and a retired Army lieu-
tenant colonel). He gave me two hours when
we were at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, and
I hadn’t finished. General Galvin said, ‘‘I’ve got
an activity. Let me make a call.’’ He called his
aide and said, ‘‘Bring my Class A uniform over
and I’ll change here.’’ And we stayed for three
hours and that’s when McCarthy said, ‘‘You
got it right now.’’ Meaning, I had enough air
power in it.
That was the first real application of the
versatility planning concept that I actually cre-
ated in 1975. Nobody paid any attention to me
then in 1975. But I brought it up again in John
Galvin’s study, where it worked, and we were
able to ‘‘not try to get’’ the most cost effective
alternative, but one that was the most versatile.
We wanted one that could cover all of these
potential situations, and, as expected, you don’t
have any probability distribution on that. I de-
veloped some theories back in 1975 about the
whole notion of a state space without the prob-
ability distribution; and how do you plan, given
that circumstance. Here you can use various
criteria like min-max and stuff of that kind.
Anyway, that was the first application for
General Galvin in 1992.
The next really big study we did was for Gen-
eral Maddox, who was then CINCUSAREUR.
His job was to reduce the total Army personnel
in Europe, including civilians, from 300,000 down
to 65,000. I was going to a conference in Portu-
gal with my wife. General Maddox called me
and asked, ‘‘Can you stop on the way over?’’
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We stopped and had dinner, and we did some
business and chatted about this study we de-
cided to do for him. The study was to help
him determine how to draw the force down,
so he could perform the missions that he was
sure he would have in this new environment
we lived in. He had all the special missions and
he had warfighting missions. He had noncom-
batant evacuation missions; he had security
missions; he had all sorts of different missions
to perform. He said, ‘‘I want you to bring the
force down to 65,000 and tell me how many
of these missions that I can perform.’’ I said,
‘‘Okay. We’ll go home.’’
I went home and what we built—myself
and two other analysts—was eventually called
the bean counter. We looked at all those differ-
ent missions and built a system that we could
use interactively. That is, we could say to the
system, I want to do one of these types of mis-
sions out of the potential four, or I want to do
two of these.
Bob Sheldon: Simultaneously?
Seth Bonder: Simultaneously. And the sys-
tem would print graphics that showed the effec-
tiveness and the risk for each of the missions.
We completed the study in Orlando, Florida.
We went down for an AUSA (Association of
the United States Army) meeting and I asked,
‘‘David, are you coming over?’’ He said, ‘‘Yes’’
because I was going to go there; he would come,
too. I said, ‘‘Let’s put aside, at least the morn-
ing, probably most of the day. We’re going to
build you a force interactively.’’ It covered all
of NATO where he had to play.
I had a guy on the computer, myself and
Maddox, and I said, ‘‘Okay, start off with what
you think you’d like to do,’’ and he said, ‘‘Well,
I want to do two of these. I want to be able to do
one of these,’’ and we had a list. I said, ‘‘That’s
about 182,000 troops you need, and here are
the curves.’’ He said, ‘‘Well, I can give up risk
over here; I could accept more risk over here.’’
We ran it, accepting more risk, and you get the
troops down lower. We interactively did what
I call a multi-objective decision problem, inter-
actively with the decision maker. We looked at
all these different objectives: the cost, risk and
effectiveness, and troop levels, which were the
cost function. We got it down to 67,000 troops.
We not only gave him that answer, but we
delivered the bean counter system to them,
over there. So they used it, and continued to
use it, to learn more about it. It was a wonder-
ful study and one I enjoyed doing. Working
with clients who have analytic skills is won-
derful. They really become part of the team.
In my theoretical research, I learned about
the importance of attack speed and how speed
interacts with mass; that was all theory. But,
in doing studies, I have over the years learned
about the dynamics of warfare, the dynamics
of forces, how they interact with each other.
Let me give you a couple of examples.
When General DePuy was looking for new
operational concepts to take on tactical fights
in Europe, we looked at battalion firefights and
learned something about their dynamics. I
noted that when an attacking brigade of sev-
eral battalions takes on a single battalion, we
have up to a six-to-one force ratio. If we look
at the ratio of attacker losses to defender losses,
the LER, we could tell if it was going to be a good
campaign or a not-so-good campaign. By plot-
ting the instantaneous LER over the course of
the battle, the change in the LER shows that at
the very beginning of a battle, the defender has
a big advantage. That is because the defender
sees the attacker, because the attacker is moving
and the defender is hiding in defilade—you can
hardly find him. The defender is getting a shot or
two or three shots off before the attacker gets
a shot off. The attacker is looking to find the de-
fender but it’s harder for the attacker to bring to
bear his mass of fires early on. The longer you
stay engaged, you start to come down that
curve. The longer the defender stays in defi-
lade the more rapidly the curve falls off, so
the advantage shifts to the attacker. Because
the attacker is firing much more at you, he’s
getting the effect of mass and speed. The at-
tacker is starting to saturate the defender’s re-
taliatory capability. If you look at that curve,
you say to yourself, if I were a smart general,
I’d want to fight with the ratio high; that is,
I’d want to initially fight very short little battles.
In our discussions with Bill DePuy, he called
this the active defense. General Meyer, the 3rd
ID commander, then looked at places to con-
duct these early defenses by building a set of
company-size positions, in depth. When some-
body attacks you, just take two or three shots,
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then get out of there by falling back. Now you
cannot do that ad infinitum but you are really
trading ground for attrition. After a while you
have to stiffen the fighting up a bit. General
Meyer and I walked the terrain and he showed
me where we could build those positions.
So the active defense became a concept that
TRADOC would embrace, that later on went
to other approaches like AirLand Battle. The
point I’m making is analysts can do more than
help to solve the decision problem. You can ac-
tually help with learning battlefield dynamics.
If you ask the right questions, you will under-
stand why things are occurring, rather than just
numbers. That was at the tactical level. When
I got to the operational level and the strategic
level, we learned more things that were of
interest.
There are things I learned at the opera-
tional and strategic level which I published in
a long article in the AUSA Journal. I think it
was Gordon Sullivan or Ted Stroup who asked
me to write the article. What I’d been learning
from 1989 to 1993 were important things about
the new security environment. I had mentioned
earlier that if we were still going to be in Europe,
with the big reduction in forces, at parity, ev-
erything became important. What I found was
the conventional warfighting would become very
sensitive to many different things: moderniza-
tion, tactics, and lots of different factors that
could affect warfighting. Modernization pro-
vides major leverage; the smaller you are, the
more modern you should be. The example I
always use is one tank on one tank. The guy
who has the better tank is going to win, partic-
ularly if he gets the first round off. We learned
that in order to minimize casualties, you really
needed to have a decisive overmatch. Now the
question was, ‘‘What does decisive mean?’’
When the National Military Strategy came out
at the same time we were doing these studies,
everybody was saying, ‘‘It’s decisive because
it’s in the strategy.’’ By doing a bunch of analyses,
we created what we called rainbow charts for
particular regions of the world.
Bob Sheldon: Describe the rainbow chart.
Seth Bonder: Part of the dynamics we
learned, when the National Military Strategy de-
scribed decisive overmatch was to win swiftly
and minimize casualties. We had already been
working on how to quantify that notion with
Bob Helmbold, and were able to create curves,
that we called the casualty warfighting relation-
ships. The force exchange ratio (FER) was on the
x-axis and the casualties for particular regions
of the world were on the y-axis. The curve shows
how many casualties you get, as a function of
the FER.
What we did in doing a lot of studies in
Southwest Asia, was to define ‘‘decisive over-
match’’ as having an FER of at least five, or
greater. That not only provided good warfight-
ing capability, it minimized casualties, it in-
creased significantly the win probability, and it
provided you with a degree of robustness.
Given the shape of the curves, if you de-
cided to mount a force that could only register
an FER 3, even though the casualties were low,
you were a lot less robust. Because if you made
a mistake on what the threat was, say by 20 per-
cent, it would jump you way up that curve,
which is exponential. We like the definition,
FER 5 or greater; it minimizes our casualties,
it maximizes the probability of a win—within
some constraints—and gives you robustness,
in case you make a mistake.
The same curves can be used to describe the
probability of a win along the FER axis. To look
at alternative solutions to problems we would
display other information such as Research and
Development dollars on the curve to show what
you get if you spend 12 billion dollars versus 6
billion dollars. We did a study for Jay Garner,
when he was the Director, Force Development,
to show the impact of different amounts of
money devoted to Research, Development and
Acquisition. We were able to plot the differences
on the curves and put the alternatives right on
the curves and show him how robust it was.
What you bought for more money was not only
better capability, but robustness of the force.
Another piece of dynamics we learned was
in looking at force projection—some of this work
was done with General Max Thurman. We found
that early arriving forces in theater, nonlinearly
reduces the risk in warfighting, and gives you
a better warfighting capability. It reduces over-
all casualties, increases the probability you will
win and gives you some robustness. You need to
get there with the right things earlier—including
your intelligence and air defense.
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As General Thurman said, ‘‘You have to be
able to see, you have to be able to protect your-
self, provide air defense, and communicate with
each other.’’ You must get these initial units in,
and come in right behind them with the maneu-
ver units – if you didn’t get there fast enough,
then you suffer higher casualties. That’s what
led us to create the window of risk we spoke
about earlier. The window was the limited pe-
riod of time that you were going to lose, with
the force that you were going to bring over,
given the mobilization, the deployment capa-
bility, and the warfighting capability. If you
could increase the deployment capability and
make it better, so you got there faster or you
got there with better stuff, then you could re-
duce the window of risk.
Bob Sheldon: Is this assuming a major re-
gional conflict (MRC), where you’re in the halt
phase?
Seth Bonder: Yes, it was actually on the de-
fensive part, but we would fight the defense
and then fight the counterattack. We’d fight
both of them. That was the window, and again,
we learned something about dynamics.
Bob Sheldon: Somewhat in the operational
art?
Seth Bonder: Yes, the operational physics is
what you’re learning about war. It was nice
because I could talk to the guys who really un-
derstood it, it was really the military. I’d say
something and they’d know it because they’re
military people, and very smart. During that
same period of time, Mike Garrambone sug-
gested I give a paper at the MORS Symposium
in Colorado Springs in 2000, and I presented
a paper on Lessons Learned from Modeling
and Analysis.
I included in those lessons at the Sympo-
sium several I had written in an article for the
Operations Research journal, the 50th Anniver-
sary Issue where I wrote about the history of
Army OR. Later, I included some of those les-
sons learned in a book on modeling and analy-
ses, which I think were very useful to a lot of
people.
In 2000, I also got elected to the National
Academy of Engineering. A lot of my friends
who were in the Academy said I should have
been there 15 years earlier, but they’re slow in
what they do. It was quite an honor. I was very
pleased to be a member of the Academy and
they make use of you.
Bob Sheldon: The MORS Symposium you’re
referring to is when you presented in the same
session with Wayne Hughes?
Seth Bonder: Yes. ‘‘Army and OR analysis—
Is the marriage over?’’ Our review showed the
history of OR and I raised questions about
where it was going from 1995 out.
Let me go back to the 1987–1988 period and
discuss the VRI component. I’ve talked about
some studies, but VRI changed a lot in that time
period too. Prior to 1988, company growth was
not a VRI objective for a lot of reasons. The
main one is I wanted to continue doing my
own hands-on analysis. If we were going to
grow, the way you really grow—big time—is
by acquisitions. That meant I’d be out search-
ing for companies and working to acquire com-
panies, which I didn’t want to do.
In the early 1980s, Bob Farrell – Bob was my
Treasurer and Executive VP and everything
else—asked me if I wanted to grow by acquisi-
tion, and I said, ‘‘No.’’ So we started giving
money out to people around me and also saving
money to buy companies in the future. That was
prior to 1987. In 1988–1989, Vector was about
80 people. I recognized then that we had to
grow, because I was losing people who wanted
career paths. If you’re not growing very much,
you don’t have career paths. So we made a de-
cision to grow, but to grow internally. Military
analysis grew from 1989 to 1995. We also saw
significant growth in the Health Analysis Divi-
sion, and we added an IT Division eventually.
Our clients wanted to use the study results
we had, so we created decision support sys-
tems for them. Then they needed databases to
use the data, the decisions part. So we learned
how to create databases—we hired IT guys to
do that. Finally they said, ‘‘Why don’t you just
build systems for it?’’ So we got into the sys-
tems building business, which we did for DoD,
the Military Health System. We got some new
clients. We started working for various Head-
quarters, Department of Treasury, the IRS, and
for Commerce, building systems.
One of the big studies we did for Treasury
was the Y2K (the Year 2000) Case Study. We
built them a Command Center so they could ob-
serve the progress of the 600 computer systems,
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getting ready for Y2K. We had this big Com-
mand Center, with graphics, so we could keep
track of the developments.
The Secretary of the Treasury, Larry
Summers, would occasionally come in and look
at the Center. We would show them which sys-
tems were behind, and needed more money. It
turns out, on New Years Eve of 2000, he came
there. I wasn’t there but the guys at the Com-
mand Center said he brought them cookies.
(Laughter). It was very nice. We did some other
studies with Treasury, which were IT-related
for the IRS and other people. So that helped
us grow some. By roughly 1995, we numbered
350. By 1997 or 1998, we were over 400. I think
our peak was about in 1999, when we numbered
about 430 people. We were grossing roughly $55
million a year. It was a nice size company.
A lot of generals retired and came to work
for us. When General Thurman got out, he got
leukemia, and was very sick. He was at Johns
Hopkins Hospital, survived that, and came here
after they let him out of Walter Reed Army Med-
ical Center. He came to work for me three or
four days a month. He was a wonderful guy,
with great ideas, but would never put anything
on paper, (Laughs) never. He said, ‘‘You gotta get
in the health business.’’ I said, ‘‘Max, Vector is
in the health business. We’ve been in the health
business since 1972, when I wrote that first pro-
posal, when we worked for National Institute
of Health (NIH).’’ He said, ‘‘No, no, no – you
have to be in the health business,’’ meaning me,
personally. I said, ‘‘I have enough to do with
running the company and trying to get 30 per-
cent direct charge.’’ That was because I always
wanted to work on projects. Even when we were
that big, I was still doing 30 percent direct
charge out—if I could—on contracts. It’s addi-
tional to the marketing I was doing. I said, ‘‘Okay.’’
So he introduced me to a gentleman named Russ
Zajtchuk, who was a Major General and head of
the Army’s Medical Research and Development
Command at Fort Detrick, Maryland. He had
worked for Max and in fact, may have extended
Max’s life; they were very good friends.
So, as my first foray into the health business,
General Zajtchuk invited me to a Military Health
System Telemedicine Conference, a working
session, a small group of maybe 50 people
worked with us. I went there and I asked Russ
if I could take Peter Cherry and George Miller
with me. We observed what they were doing
in the health business. The guys I brought
with me were military analysts, not health
analysts. The health people tended to be much
more economics-oriented, running large infor-
mation systems for the military health organiza-
tions; something called DMIS, Defense Medical
Information System.
They were talking about what services you
were getting. So I took my two military guys
and the moderator was Charlie Flagle, who had
offered me the scholarship at Johns Hopkins,
way back in 1960. (Laughs). I’d seen him occasion-
ally through my ORSA associations, but hadn’t
seen him in quite a few years, and he was moder-
ating this. It ran for two days, and I just went
around and listened to what people were talking
about. At the end they had a debrief, and some of
the key panel heads got up and talked about
what they were doing or what they learned.
It was then that Charlie made a mistake. He
asked me what I thought about the conference.
And I said, ‘‘Well I think that the conference
was good.’’ I said, ‘‘I’m just shocked at the
state of the art of analysis, if you call it that, in
the health area. It’s archaic. It’s in the Dark Ages.’’
I went on to really tear into the Telemedicine part
of the Military Health System, and Charlie said,
‘‘You know, he’s right, we really are. We have
not pushed and moved to the state of the art
of what could be done.’’ Peter Cherry and
George Miller both agreed with me. So we did
the Telemedicine thing and then moved over,
more into the broader aspect of the healthcare de-
livery system within the Military Health System.
As an example of telemedicine, you are a pa-
tient and you’re out in Seattle, but you’re not
near where your dermatologist is. You get on
a TV screen and the dermatologist looks at the
thing on your hand and says, ‘‘Oh, I know what
that is’’ and he prescribes something for you,
and he never sees you. It’s medicine via televi-
sion. It’s more sophisticated than that now. A
lot of ophthalmology can be done this way now.
You don’t have to be anywhere near the ophthal-
mologist. But he can look right into your eye,
from afar. My early work was in the telemedicine
arena in trying to understand how it could have
some value. That got me personally into the
whole issue of the healthcare delivery system,
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with two aspects. One is the treatment of acute
disease, and how we treat people when you find
something wrong with them. And, second, the
prevention and management of disease. It be-
came clear to me that everything they did to an-
alyze what to do for the future was retrospective.
They looked at what they had been doing
and to make a change, it was trial and error.
They’d say, ‘‘We’re going to try this new piece
of equipment.’’ They’d put it in, they’d watch
it for three years and then throw it away. The
whole business was a trial and error. Costs were
escalating, it was inefficient. I said, ‘‘There has
to be a better way to do this.’’ I said, ‘‘We need
to bring analysis into this process—an analysis
process—not retrospective statistical analysis,
because that’s nice for evaluating how well you’re
doing. And maybe we need to introduce inference
a little beyond what you’re doing.’’ So we use these
models much more for prediction and planning,
not evaluation. Instead of evaluation and infer-
ence, we’re talking about planning and prediction.
All of the models that they used were statis-
tical models. All the economists regress on some
parameters, and they have Cobb-Douglas func-
tions and various things, but it’s all statistical. It
dawned on me, and I think others will agree,
that’s nice for evaluation and inference; but the
model depends on the data that you feed the
model. That data describes a current system. It
has nothing to do with the future, and in fact,
it’s irrelevant when you talk about the future.
That is, your model has intrinsic value, the cur-
rent system. You can’t get to the future system.
And I said, ‘‘But you’re using all the data
from the current system. You can’t do 10-year
forecasts. We’re going to build the analog of
the VECTOR Series models and help.’’ My guys
thought I was nuts, because I didn’t know any-
thing about health. But, I had read and I had
gone to conferences. Some of the words would
run way over my head but I said, ‘‘We’re going
to do that.’’
I got Russ Zajtchuk to fund us and we built
what was called the Healthcare Complex Model,
because it models a large complex that delivers
healthcare services. It is a model that simulates
a large enterprise. Let me give you an example
of size. The model can be used to analyze the
delivery of healthcare in an enterprise that
has one or two major medical centers, like
Bethesda and Walter Reed, operating, with pa-
tients coming in and out. Five or 10 hospitals
and maybe 10 or 15 clinics, that’s an enterprise,
that’s complex. The model simulates, just like
a simulation, but has a lot of analytic stuff in
it. The model simulates individual patients com-
ing in and following them through a complete
episode of care.
Now an episode of care means, you walk in,
then you get diagnosed and you have a chest
pain and you need to have tests; you get an
EKG, you get a thallium stress test, take blood;
you assess that, you come up with a diagnosis,
you get treated. And when you come out the
other end—you’re not just there to visit—you
come out the other end and you are a recovering
patient. Or, maybe, you go to surgery. Then you
are a recovering surgical patient, and the simu-
lation keeps track of you. The model simulates
all of that. I’ll give you an example of this. We
tested it at Madigan, which is an Army Medical
Center in Seattle, with some small number of
hospitals and clinics. We ran that model for a
year and then compared it to the results that
they had the year that we built the model for.
The model simulates more than a million
outpatient services. Inside it are the brains of
the models called protocols. If you say some-
body comes in with this pain and here’s what
you do with that person: get these tests, do this,
check his ear, have him see an ophthalmologist;
they’re called protocols, they’re called path-
ways, sometimes guidelines, that’s what physi-
cians do. It has something like 1,500 guidelines
for different diseases and actions you could
take. It keeps track of 60 different physician
types. It’s fairly sophisticated—it’s like fight-
ing a war in Europe, in the VECTOR Series.
We built that and we started using it in the mil-
itary health system.
I believe they’ve been using it for some
counter-terrorism stuff in looking at the impact
of a terrorist attack that would result in mass
casualties and how the health system would re-
spond. They need to see what kind of capability
the hospital system has to take care of patients.
They keep adding to the model. So that was one
of the models we built, which was really di-
rected by me. Not that I know a lot about the
health care industry personally, but we got all
the health people to build it, and I was there,
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making sure we were physics-based, to the ex-
tent we could be.
The other piece we did, that I got involved
with, was diabetes. One of my guys built a model
of the aging of diabetics. You’re a diabetic and
we’re going to age you 20 years—we’ll see what
happens to your disease, given different treat-
ment protocols. So we simulated out 20 years.
What was interesting is that after five years of
the simulation, we could see that the number of
good protocols, as opposed to the bad ones, re-
duced the number of emergency visits by almost
30 percent. The number of really bad physical
problems—like going blind, and having to cut
limbs off—dropped by about 25 percent. The
Army liked this study so much, they then funded
clinical trials for five years at Brooks Air Force
Base in San Antonio.
I haven’t tracked it since then, but after
three years of the trials, they looked pretty much
like the simulation. This doesn’t say that we
showed how to fix diabetes, because the real
issue is to get people to follow the protocols.
But we can do analysis on the protocols.
I think I stimulated getting more OR into
our Health Division, and they still have lots of
work to do. A lot of the military guys have
moved over to the health side. George Miller is
in the health business; Mike Potter, and a whole
bunch of others, have moved over there and
they are very powerful people. That was the
health stuff in Vector as the company grew. I
did get Vector into the Veterans Administration
(VA) for studies and we started to expand out
in the military health system but most impor-
tantly, I think we got the military health system
to start thinking about their system and that
I think was very useful. Now that ends the pe-
riod up to 2000, so let’s talk about 2000 to the
present. Which is fortunate—my career is still
going (Laughs). As I said earlier, I call this my
age of freedom. It’s freedom because I don’t
have to manage anybody anymore.
Bob Sheldon: Before, you said you had a
major lifestyle change?
Seth Bonder: I didn’t quite finish there. A
couple of things happened. In 1999, I did decide
that we would change how we would grow be-
cause we started to level off again after 10 years.
I now decided we’re just going to have to do
acquisitions and we were a $50 million dollar
company and I thought that the only way to
take it to a $500 million dollar company was
to start acquiring companies. We had some
money saved—we had not issued many divi-
dends. So that’s what I decided in 1999; and
wouldn’t you know it, in October of 1999, I
came down with kidney cancer.
A friend of mine is an oncologist and one
day he said, ‘‘You know, you never had Com-
puterized Axial Tomography (CAT) scans, and
you haven’t had a colonoscopy.’’ I was then
68 years old and didn’t feel bad. I said, ‘‘Okay.’’
So I submitted to all those.
He had my secretary, Lisa Gaines, get hold
of me and asked me to come in to see him.
I did and he said, ‘‘You have a lesion in your
kidney.’’ For some reason lesion and tumor
didn’t connect. I said, ‘‘A lesion?’’ He said, ‘‘A
tumor.’’ I said, ‘‘Is it cancer?’’ He said, ‘‘Yes.’’
I said, ‘‘You sure?’’ He said, ‘‘Absolutely.’’ And
I said, ‘‘What are we going to do?’’ (Laughs)
‘‘We’re going to take it out.’’ I said, ‘‘The cancer?’’
He said, ‘‘No, the kidney.’’ ‘‘When are we going to
do that?’’ He said, ‘‘Next Wednesday. The sur-
geon’s coming over now, the urologist, a guy
named Hugh Sullivan.’’ He came in to see me
and he said, ‘‘We’re going to take it out next
Wednesday because it’s encapsulated, meaning
it’s inside the kidney; that’s good.’’ I said, ‘‘Is it
possible to postpone it for a week?’’ He said,
‘‘Why?’’ I said, ‘‘Well, I’m lecturing at NPS next
Monday and Tuesday and then I want to go to
the wine country and party for a little bit.’’ (Laughs)
He said, ‘‘Of course, you’re joking?’’ And I said,
‘‘No, I’m serious.’’ The surgeon looked at the
x-ray and he said, ‘‘We can see how fast it’s been
growing, you have a week, but you have to be
back the following Monday.’’ I said, ‘‘Okay.’’
So I went to Monterey and I came back, and
they took the kidney out. I was out of work for
about four weeks, recuperating. It was a sig-
nificant surgery. Today it’d be a lot better; they
were doing laparoscopically. Vector used to
have three or four physicians in the company
besides nurses, and Jack Taylor said, ‘‘You get
the doughboy operation. They cut you and then
they twist you open and they stick (Laughter)
your head in there.’’ ‘‘That’s great Jack. Thank
you.’’ Anyway, they did that and I went back
to work. A little hard walking, I got on the tread-
mill early and started doing stuff.
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It became clear to me that there was no way
I would have the energy to take the company
to the $500 million level. So I told folks in the
company, ‘‘I think it’s time that I have to sell
it.’’ I’ve got 31 years into it and I offered man-
agement first option. I said, ‘‘If you can raise
enough money to buy it at what I think is a rea-
sonable price, you guys can buy it.’’ A lot of
them already had stock. Over the course of the
years, I ended up with 51 percent of this com-
pany. I wouldn’t go lower than that. My good
friend John Kettelle had taught me a lesson
years ago. He once had a company, Ketron. He
brought in people, gave them stock, gave them
too much and they fired him. So John taught
me a lesson: it’s a benevolent democracy. Any-
way, I was committed to trying to sell it, and in
2000 I started looking and offered management
the option. They could raise some money—not
that I was outlandish—but I knew they would
be lower than other corporations would bid
for it. But they were way low (Laughs). It just
seemed not appropriate. So I had a change of
policy that we’d go outside, rather than me just
try to grow it again. I looked around, and had
one of the local companies here in Washington
look for potential buyers. We had some come
in on their own, when the word got around.
They started with 17 buyers—eventually they
narrowed it to seven. We had a few others, from
the ecological players here in town and ended
up with, surprisingly, one in Ann Arbor. It was
the company that used to be called the Environ-
mental Research Institute of Michigan (ERIM).
It was the old Willow Run Laboratories from
the 1950s that they spun off for a dollar from
the state and then they had this multispectral
sensing company. They created two companies,
a for-profit ERIM and a not-for-profit ERIM.
They sold the for-profit a number of years be-
fore we got together to Veridian. Then they
had all this cash (Laughs) and there I was and
they needed projects of a research nature. They
made an offer, we negotiated. I got the offer I
wanted and sold it in May 2001, so it’s now
been four and half years. That’s why I said, in
2000 and maybe it was more like 2001 (Laughs),
it became my age of freedom. The company
changed its name; it’s now called the Altarum
Institute. It’s a nonprofit. Some people I know
are on the Board: Jacques Gansler is on their
Board, a good friend. He’s the Chairman of the
Board now. It was a good sale. There wasn’t any
stock involved because they’re a nonprofit. We
knew we were going to consummate this earlier
than May, probably six months early. We were
working towards getting all the paperwork and
all the arrangements and the incentives and bo-
nuses, just to keep the good people on board. I be-
came unemployed (Laughter). Not true, and they
actually wanted me to work for 18 months; the
new CEO, who came from General Motors,
wanted me to stay on and advise him. When any-
body asks me to advise them, I always tell them,
‘‘Don’t ask for what you may not like.’’ (Laughter)
And sure enough, his style of management was
different from mine, and after six months, we
agreed to part ways. It was fine.
They owned the company, they should run
it the way they want to run it, and I became
free. I sold VRI in 2001. I’ve continued my ex-
tensive work with the Army Science Board.
When I got off in 1992, Peter Cherry was on
the Board and when he got off in 1998, either
Paul Kern or Walt Hollis asked me if I’d come
back, so I went back on the Army Science Board
in 1998. I’ve done a bunch of studies with them
over the last six years. I just got off the Board
again; it’s a six-year tour or two three-year
tours, or something like that.
We did some interesting stuff with the
Army Science Board, and I grew up with them,
starting in 1972, so I really have a great alle-
giance to the Board. I’ve since then become a
member of the Board on Army, Science and
Technology, the BAST, which is a National
Academy Board; it’s chaired by George Singley
and John Miller now. Glenn Otis asked me
to accept the offer to join the Board. Malcolm
O’Neill is on the Board. These are retired gen-
erals, and a bunch of fairly senior technology
people are on the Board. The Air Force has an
analogous board, the Air Force Scientific Advi-
sory Board and the Navy has an analogous
board, as part of the Academy. So I became
a member of the BAST.
I provide strategic advice to the University
of Michigan Comprehensive Cancer Center.
I’m on their advisory board to the Chairman;
same with the Kellogg Eye Center. What I bring
is not a lot of knowledge about cancer, but I’m in-
terested in cancer, obviously. I bring OR thinking,
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which although those of us in the business don’t
think it’s that special, it is quite different from
the rest of the people in the world. I bring a differ-
ent thought process to that. I sit on the Commu-
nity College Board in town. I sit on two startup
boards, and I sit on the OSU and University of
Michigan Engineering External Advisory Boards.
The reason I call it my age of freedom, I’m
free to pick and do what I want to do. I work
on studies that I want to work on; I turn down
those I don’t want to. I go wherever I want to
go. (Laughs) I’m free, which is very nice, and I
don’t have to manage, I don’t have to market.
The only one I’m responsible to is me and my
family. I created a number of endowments when
I made money selling Vector, not as much as
some people think but enough to keep me
happy the rest of my life. I decided to give
a bunch away, so I established a scholarship at
OSU, to mimic the same fellowship I went on
in 1960. Of course, the original has disappeared.
As you probably gather, I do a lot of pro
bono stuff and some of it is done for the Na-
tional Academy. I do studies for them. I’ve sat
on peer review committees for the National
Academy to get people into the Academy. I’m
just finishing up one study looking at opera-
tional testing at the DoD. For evolutionary
acquisition, what did the testing look like?
We’re just finishing a study on that. I did an-
other study, just finishing, on how to bring more
engineering into healthcare delivery. Not just
into better technology, but how to make the de-
livery system better. There’s a report coming out
on that soon. The National Academy has three
pieces: the National Academy of Engineering,
engineers go here; the National Academy of Sci-
ences, biologists go here; and then the Institute
of Medicine (IOM), where all the medical people
go. They’re all commissioned studies. I got a call
from somebody high up in IOM, who asked me if
I would join a study they’re going to start on
looking at how to restructure the mental health-
care delivery system in the country.
I said, ‘‘I know nothing about mental
health’’ and just jokingly said, ‘‘I’m not going
to be a case study either.’’ (Laughter) They said,
‘‘No, we need a systems engineer.’’ There are
going to be some 13 psychiatrists, three or four
psychologists, and one or two public health
people, who have all been working in mental
health and substance abuse for years. ‘‘But we
need somebody with a different thought process.’’
Well, he was right (Laughs). The study was 15
months long and the findings briefly got released
to the press at the Jimmy Carter Center in Geor-
gia. The report will be out in early December. So
that’s done, but it was a very difficult study for
me in a sense that I kept bringing OR thought
processes to this and they think differently.
If I say to you, look Bob, you’re at A; and to
get to B, you do this and then you get to B; and
then you do this to get to C; and once you’re at
C, then you’ve got an integrated system. They
don’t think that way at all. Just as sort of an
aside, the mental healthcare delivery system is
almost separate from the rest of the healthcare
delivery system in this country, for lots of rea-
sons, both in public and private sector. I was
pushing for more integration, and since the re-
port’s not out, I can’t tell you some of the inter-
esting findings and recommendations. But that
was a study that I just finished. We have one
more meeting to figure out what to do to get
it implemented. I had recommended, as part
of our report, we have an implementation strat-
egy. That is, just telling somebody to do some-
thing doesn’t get it done. They didn’t do that.
There were 13 reviewers of the study; the Acad-
emy has all those studies heavily reviewed before
they go out. Four of them recommended –
what’s your strategy for implementation? We
don’t have it; so we have to create one, eventu-
ally. I’m just starting a new one, this one’s coming
out of the Air Force Studies Board, part of the
Academy, and that’s why I’m in town; the first
meeting’s tomorrow. I’m not sure I know much
about it, other than it has to do with aircraft,
stealth, and some things. It’s going to be code
word stuff, so that’s all I know about the study
and I’ll find out more about it tomorrow. But
that’s some of the pro bono work that I enjoy.
But I picked those that I want to work on. I
probably got asked to do three times as much
and turned most of them down, because they
just don’t look interesting.
Interesting things are those that I can con-
tribute to and when it’s done, it’s going to be use-
ful to somebody. I have been, over this five-year
period, presenting some keynote talks in forums
and other places and presented some memorial
lectureships at various schools throughout the
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country. And I’ve been doing some consulting in
the defense industry and some in the health
industry.
Let me wrap it up with an overall comment.
I could talk about OR and military OR, with les-
sons learned and what students ought to do and
all of that. I don’t want to do that. What I really
want to do is to have people recognize you don’t
have a career without a lot of other people. Ca-
reers aren’t solos—maybe if you’re a singer—
but not in OR. Even though I did the initial the-
oretical work on the differential models, the
growth on those depended on a lot of people.
Many academicians mentored me. I had mathe-
maticians to bang ideas off of when I started get-
ting into equations that I couldn’t solve, and
neither could they. You get help along the way,
all the time, as an academician, and you make
friends and you get a lot of mentors who help
you in various ways from how to teach ethics
in analysis and a bunch of other stuff. I can’t
overstate the importance of all of the support
that came from guys like Bob Farrell, Peter
Cherry, Dave Thompson, George Miller, Allen
Weintraub, and many others, on the growth
of the whole differential models of combat.
These are used, not only in the Battalion, but
the VECTOR Series; as they go from VECTOR 0
all the way to VECTOR 3; there must be eight
or nine versions, for different regions of the
world. That doesn’t happen with one person;
it happens with everybody contributing. I di-
rected and managed, but a lot of ideas came
from others and we implemented as a team. It
comes from having great clients. I have to tell
you, all of my clients understood what I was
doing and they were willing to contribute.
I’m talking about senior people like DePuy,
Thurman, Otis, Maddox, Foster, and Kent.
Wilbur Payne was a major influence on my ca-
reer, in his sardonic ways. I value all of our ses-
sions where we taught each other so many
things. All of that work contributes to having
your career. My clients, who were not only clients,
but helped me do some of the work, and even
when they were working for me, they’ve been
friends, my whole life. It’s been a wonderful ca-
reer, full of great intellectual things, full of great
joys, full of lots of sadness when you do the
wrong things, and full of a lot of learning, which
is what I always have to do. It never stops. I hope
this history is useful to some other people who
get into this business. It’s such a great business.
Bob Sheldon: You mentioned your relation-
ship with other people like Saul Gass. Is your re-
lationship with him via INFORMS?
Seth Bonder: It was professional through
ORSA, before INFORMS. I think it was Jack
Borsting and myself who started the visiting lec-
tureship program, and Saul was part of that.
I met Saul through ORSA. He and I presented
papers at various conferences together. For one
of them, an OR-themed applied mathematics
conference organized by Saul for the American
Mathematical Society (1979), I presented and
wrote a paper, ‘‘Mathematical Modeling of
Military Conflict Situations,’’ that appeared
in the proceedings Saul edited.
Yes, I’ve known Saul for a long time, but it’s
all through ORSA. Comradeship. What is nice
in my career is that I’ve had that comradeship
through ORSA. A lot of them were academics,
so in part, they related to my academic side.
But I had a separate group of academicians
who are part of my career and we were a sepa-
rate group of comrades.
Obviously, growing Vector, with all of the
people in Vector, who were like family, and we
ran it like a family, are among my comrades.
The clients of Vector were among my comrades.
Then you go to the Army Science Board and it’s
a whole new group of people. And MORS is an-
other group of people.
So I had ORSA, MORS, the Army Science
Board, the National Academy of Engineering,
Vector and the teaching part. They’ve all been
pieces of an integrated career. I’m not sure
how I did all of it, probably not well (Laughs).
When I look back on my life and wonder if
I’ve contributed something, I think: ‘‘Yes, I
did.’’ And, you look back on all the friendships
which are everlasting, they just go on.
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